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Overlay networks are a technique to build a new network on top of an existing one. They are a
key tool to add functionality to existing networks, and are used in different layers of the Internet
stack for a wide variety of purposes, like confidentiality, Quality of Service, virtual networking, etc.
Specifically, network overlays in the IP networking layer are widely used in some of these use cases.
However, these kind of overlay networks do not have as many functionalities as overlays in other
layers. For example, thanks to the Zero Trust Networking paradigm it is possible to build secure
overlay networks at L7 using HTTPS.
Taking this into account, this thesis strives to add new features and improve on others of
IP overlay networks, in order to support emerging challenges. This thesis focuses on three axes:
security, trust, and deployment in enterprise scenarios. First, regarding security, we explore how
to simplify the setup of secure tunnels over the Internet, without relying on external Public Key
Infrastructure or proprietary solutions. To this purpose, we leverage WireGuard, a state of the art
VPN protocol, and add a control plane on top of it to distribute encryption keys. In addition, we
present the implementation of a prototype and a performance evaluation.
Second, with respect to trust, we investigate how emerging blockchain technology can be used
in distributed mapping systems. Mapping systems are a database used in some overlay network
deployments to assist in the creation of tunnels, by storing overlay to underlay pairs of addresses.
Mapping systems are not commonly used in scenarios with multiple administrative domains, due
to configuration complexity and centralized control. We explore how some of the properties of
blockchains, such as distributed control, or auditability, can help in building these type of mapping
systems. We take into account both the policy aspects, that is, the advantages of a distributed
trust scheme, and the technical ones, like simplified management. In addition, we present two
deployment scenarios: one to increase the security of BGP-based inter-domain routing, and a set
of cooperating companies that want to establish communications among themselves.
Finally, we focus on the deployment of enterprise networks leveraging overlay networks. First,
we discuss the challenges present in current enterprise networks, such as segmentation, mobility,
or simplified operations. Then, we present a design based on overlay networks and SDN principles
to address them, along with an evaluation of two real-life deployments. We conclude with a design
tailored for future enterprise networks, based also on overlay networks and a layered approach. This
solution aims to provide mobility, multi-homing, confidentiality, user and application identity, and
access control policies for enterprise endpoints connected from any network, either in the campus
or outside.
Keywords: overlay networks, IP networks, mapping system, blockchain, enterprise networks,




Les xarxes superposades o overlays són una tècnica per a construir una xarxa sobre una d’existent.
Són una eina fonamental per a afegir funcionalitat a xarxes ja existents, i es fan servir en diferents
capes de la pila de protocols d’Internet per a diferents objectius, com ara confidencialitat, Qualitat
de Servei, virtualització de xarxes, etc. Espećıficament, les xarxes superposades a la capa de xarxa
IP es fan servir àmpliament per alguns d’aquest casos d’ús. No obstant, aquest tipus de xarxes
superposades no tenen tanta funcionalitat com overlays en altres capes. Per exemple, gràcies al
paradigma Zero Trust és possible construir xarxes superposades segures a la capa 7 amb HTTPS.
Tenint això en compte, aquesta tesi vol afegir noves funcionalitats i millorar-ne d’altres en
xarxes IP superposades, amb l’objectiu d’afrontar nous reptes. Aquesta tesi es centra en tres eixos:
seguretat, confiança i desplegament en escenaris de xarxes empresarials. En primer lloc, pel que
fa a seguretat, explorem com simplificar la configuració de túnels segurs a través d’Internet, sense
dependre d’una infraestructura de clau pública externa o de solucions propietàries. Per a aquest
objectiu, utilitzem WireGuard, un protocol VPN d’última generació i li afegim un pla de control
per a distribuir les claus d’encriptació. A més, presentem la implementació d’un prototip i una
avaluació del seu rendiment.
En segon lloc, respecte la confiança, investiguem com les tecnologies emergents basades en
cadenes de blocs (blockchain) es poden fer servir en sistemes de mapatge distribüıts. Els sistemes de
mapatge són una base de dades que es fa servir en alguns desplegaments de xarxes superposades per
a ajudar en la creació dels túnels; normalment guarden parelles d’adreces que tradueixen l’adreça
de la xarxa superposada a la de la xarxa de sota. Els sistemes de mapatge no es solen utilitzar
en escenaris amb múltiples dominis administratius, degut a la complexitat de la configuració i
a la centralització del seu control. En aquesta part explorem com algunes de les propietats de
les cadenes de blocs, com el control distribüıt o l’auditabilitat poden ajudar a construir aquests
tipus de sistemes de mapatge. Tenim en compte tant els aspectes poĺıtics, és a dir, els avantatges
d’un esquema de confiança distribüıt, com tècnics, per exemple, una gestió més simple. A més,
presentem dos escenaris de desplegament: un per a incrementar la seguretat de l’enrutament basat
en BGP entre diferents dominis, i un altre d’un conjunt d’empreses que cooperen per a establir
comunicacions entre elles.
Finalment, ens centrem en el desplegament de xarxes per a empreses fent servir xarxes super-
posades. En primer lloc, detallem els reptes que hi ha actualment a les xarxes per a empreses,
per exemple, segmentació, mobilitat o simplificació de les operacions. A continuació, presentem un
disseny basat en xarxes superposades i principis SDN que aborda els reptes que hem mencionat,
a més d’una avaluació de dos desplegaments reals. Acabem amb una solució dissenyada per a les
xarxes empresarials del futur, també basat en xarxes superposades i una aproximació per capes.
Aquesta solució està dirigida a oferir mobilitat, connexió simultània (multi-homing), confidencial-
itat, identitat de l’usuari i l’aplicació, i poĺıtiques de control d’accés per a dispositius connectats
des de qualsevol xarxa, sigui des de l’oficina o des de fora.
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mobilitat de xarxa.
Resumen
Las redes superpuestas u overlays son una técnica para construir una nueva red encima de una
ya existente. Son una herramienta clave para añadir funcionalidad a redes existentes, y se usan en
diferentes capas de la pila de protocolos de Internet para una gran variedad de propósitos, como
confidencialidad, Calidad de Servicio, redes virtuales, etc. Espećıficamente, las redes superpuestas
en la capa de red IP son ampliamente usadas para algunos de estos casos de uso. No obstante,
este tipo de redes no disponen de tantas funcionalidades como redes superpuestas en otras capas.
Por ejemplo, gracias al paradigma Zero Trust es posible construir redes superpuestas seguras en la
capa 7 usando HTTPS.
Teniendo esto en cuenta, esta tesis tiene como objetivo añadir nuevas funcionalidades y mejorar
otras de las redes IP superpuestas, con el propósito de afrontar los nuevos retos que van apareciendo.
Esta tesis se centra en tres ejes: seguridad, confianza y despliegue en escenarios empresariales. En
primer lugar, y respecto a la seguridad, exploramos cómo simplificar la configuración de túneles
seguros a través de Internet, sin usar una infraestructura de clave pública externa o soluciones
propietarias. Para este objetivo, utilizamos WireGuard, un protocolo VPN de última generación,
y le añadimos un plano de control para distribuir las claves de encriptado. Además, presentamos
la implementación de un prototipo y una evaluación de rendimiento.
En segundo lugar, en relación a la confianza, investigamos como las tecnoloǵıas emergentes
basadas en cadena de bloques (blockchain) se pueden usar en sistemas de mapeado distribuidos.
Los sistemas de mapeado son una base de datos que se utiliza en algunas redes superpuestas para
ayudar en la creación de los túneles. Normalmente, estos sistemas guardan parejas de direcciones
que traducen direcciones de la red superpuesta a la de la red subyacente. Los sistemas de mapeado
no son muy utilizados en escenarios con múltiples dominios administrativos, debido a la complejidad
de la configuración y a la centralización del control. En esta parte exploramos como algunas de
las propiedades de las cadenas de bloques, como el control distribuido, o la auditabilidad, pueden
ser de ayuda en la construcción de este tipo de sistemas de mapeado. Tomamos en consideración
tanto los aspectos poĺıticos, esto es, las ventajas de un esquema de confianza distribuido, como los
técnicos, por ejemplo, una gestión más simple. También presentamos dos escenarios de despliegue:
uno para aumentar la seguridad del enrutamiento basado en BGP entre diferentes dominios, y otro
de un conjunto de empresas que cooperan para establecer conexiones entre ellas.
Finalmente, nos centramos en el despliegue de redes empresariales usando redes superpuestas.
En primer lugar, detallamos los retos que existen hoy en d́ıa en las redes empresariales, por ejemplo,
segmentación, movilidad, o simplificación de las operaciones. A continuación, presentamos un
diseño basado en redes superpuestas y principios SDN que aborda los retos que hemos mencionado,
junto con la evaluación de dos despliegues reales. Concluimos con una solución diseñada para
las redes empresariales del futuro, basada también en redes superpuestas y una aproximación
por capas. Esta solución tiene como propósito ofrecer movilidad, conexión simultánea (multi-
homing), confidencialidad, identificación de usuario y aplicación, y poĺıticas de control de acceso
para dispositivos conectados desde cualquier red, sea en la oficina o fuera.
ix
x
Palabras clave: redes superpuestas, redes IP, sistema de mapeado, blockchain, redes empre-




1.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Background: Overlay Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7.1 Blockchain for Internet Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.7.2 Architectures for Enterprise Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.8 State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.8.1 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.8.2 Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.8.3 Deployment in Enterprise Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
I Blockchain Applications to Address Assignment 13
2 Background 15
2.1 Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.2 Relationship to Security on the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Consensus Algorithms for Blockchains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation: Byzantine Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2 Proof of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.3 Proof of Stake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.4 Network of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.5 Graph-based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Public Internet 25
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 IP Address Allocation and RPKI Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
xi
xii CONTENTS
3.3 Why blockchain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1 Technical Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.2 Policy Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Which consensus algorithm? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.1 Proof of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.2 Proof of Stake for IP prefix allocation and delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4.3 PoS Resistance to Monopolies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4.4 Network of Trust Consensus Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Architecture of IPchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5.1 IP prefixes as coins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5.3 PoS Consensus Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.4 Supported Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.5 Flexible Trust: Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.6 Other considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6.1 PoS Consensus Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7 Experimental evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.7.1 Blockchain Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.7.2 Cryptography Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.7.3 Long-term Storage Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.8.1 Blockchain Applications to Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.8.2 IP Address Allocation in the Public Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.9 Summary of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 Private Networks 47
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Why Blockchain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.1 Policy interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.2 Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.3 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.4 Typical Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.1 GBP Command Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.2 Blockchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.3 OpenOverlayRouter Software Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5.1 Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
CONTENTS xiii
4.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.7 Summary of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
II Architectures for Enterprise Networks 63
5 Data Plane Security 65
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2 Background: WireGuard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.1 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.3.3 Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4.1 Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.4.2 Central Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.5.1 End-to-end Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5.2 Control Channel Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5.3 Central Server Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5.4 Handover Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.5.5 Data Plane Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.6 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.6.1 Virtual Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.6.2 Multi-homing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.6.3 Mobility Double Jump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.7.1 Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.7.2 Secure Data Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.8 Summary of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6 A Design for Current Enterprise Networks 81
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2 Requirements and Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.3 Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.3.2 Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3.3 Data Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.3.4 Mobility Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
xiv CONTENTS
6.3.5 Support for L2 services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.4.1 Routing Server Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.4.2 State Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.4.3 Massive Mobility Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.5 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.5.1 Underlay Connectivity Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.5.2 Edge Routers Rebooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.5.3 Selecting the Policy Enforcement Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.5.4 Updating Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.6.1 SDN Pioneering Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.6.2 BeyondCorp and Zero Trust Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.6.3 Other Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.7 Summary of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7 A Design for Future Enterprise Networks 109
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.3 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.3.1 Support for Socket API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.3.2 Extended Socket API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.4 Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.5 Summary of Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8 Conclusions 117
8.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.2.1 Blockchain Applications to Address Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.2.2 Architectures for Enterprise Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.3 List of Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Bibliography 121
List of Figures
1.1 Reference architecture for overlay networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Thesis objectives with respect to the reference architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Methodology for the blockchain applications part. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Methodology for the enterprise networks part. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Centralized and distributed trust. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Simplified blockchain operation in four layers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Balance between complete centralization or decentralization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Simplified principle of operation of network of trust algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 Amount of RIPE’s IPv4 address space covered by ROAs, in /24 units. . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 IP address allocation hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Sample RPKI certificate hierarchy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 Percentage of IPv4 addresses of each RIR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Transaction workflow example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6 Sample usage scenario of IPchain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.7 IPchain prototype architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.8 DKG and BLS operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.9 Number of transactions in each block and block time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.10 Minimum block time depending on BLS Threshold setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.11 Delay to create private keys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.12 20-year storage estimation for IPchain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 Global architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Layered architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Example scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Typical architecture workflow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.5 Hyperledger CouchDB query latency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.6 Latency to add a new user for different number of endorsers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.7 Chain size vs. number of transactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.8 Chain size depending on the number of required endorsers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.9 CDF for LISP Map Server query delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
xv
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
5.1 Global design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2 WireGuard header structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.3 WireGuard packet transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.4 Simplified prototype operation diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.5 Tunnel Establishment end-to-end delay CDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.6 Out of the box OOR implementation diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.7 Delay to request and configure a new endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.8 Central server response delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.9 Handover delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.10 Handover evaluation setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.11 Throughput comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.1 Classical design for enterprise networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.2 Global design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.3 Initial packet loss reduction with default entry in edge routers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.5 Host Onboarding Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.6 Ingress and egress pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.7 Endpoint mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.8 Updating stale entries via data plane messages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.9 Routing server performance evaluation depending on the number of stored routes. . 97
6.10 Boxplot (95%) of the delay of route requests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.11 Campus Network Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.12 Number of FIB entries in border vs. edge router for three different weeks. . . . . . . 100
6.13 Warehouse Network Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.14 Handover delay for event-driven (LISP) and proactive (BGP) protocols . . . . . . . 102
6.15 Permille hits on drop rules over all hits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.16 Policy Enforcement on Ingress and Egress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.1 Deployment example of the layered architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
List of Tables
1.1 Possible approaches for encrypted connections over the Internet. . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Comparison between classical PKIs and blockchains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Scalability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1 Sample WireGuard Cryptokey Routing Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 Equivalence of section 5.3.3 messages and LISP messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3 Comparison of common data plane encryption protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.1 Summary of current state of the art, challenges, and design decisions . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2 Types of Control Plane Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3 Deployments used for evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.4 Details of campus deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.5 Average number of FIB entries for a 5 week period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.1 Layered approach for our design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.2 Proposed protocol stack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.3 Fields in the custom header. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.4 Proposed protocol stack with support for standard socket API. . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
xvii




2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Context
The last 10 years have seen a paradigm shift in computer networking, both in the industry and in
research due to the emergence of Software Defined Networking (SDN [1]). The key principles of
SDN, like control and data plane separation, centralized control or programmability [2] have been
successfully applied to all kinds of production networks: datacenter, ISPs, enterprises, etc. On the
research front, the query ”Software Defined Networking” returns around 2 million results in Google
Scholar.
More recently, the principle of programmability has been significantly expanded by the intro-
duction of programmable data planes, i.e. programs in domain-specific high-level languages that are
compiled and executed in novel hardware platforms capable of modifying their forwarding behavior
according to these programs [3]. This trend is creating new research areas like network-specific
programming languages [4], or their formal verification [5].
One of the main elements in SDN-enabled networks is the southbound protocol, that connects
the data plane and the control plane, and transfers forwarding tables, route updates, statistics, etc.
Interestingly, the vast majority of the southbound protocols leverage a proactive approach, that
is, sending the forwarding information in advance from the SDN controller to the switch. Indeed,
OpenFlow [6], as the de facto standard for southbound protocols, follows this model, although it
includes the packet-in message to ask the controller new rules for packets that don’t match the
ones present in the switch. Its natural successor, P4Runtime [7], takes a similar approach, because
it generates an API that can be accessed by the SDN controller to program the forwarding tables.
On the other hand, reactive protocols, i.e. requesting forwarding entries on demand, driven
by traffic patterns, are not common in SDN scenarios. Nevertheless, they present interesting
advantages like a reduction in data plane state, or better adaptability to traffic patterns. In this
thesis we aim to explore such benefits and improve several of their associated elements, more
specifically overlay networks. Overlay networks are strongly related to SDN; they have been used
in different SDN designs, for example, to create virtual networks with VXLAN [8], as a southbound
SDN protocol [9], to simplify SDN deployment [10], or to offer QoS [11].
Hence, the combination of SDN and overlay networks is powerful and can support a wide range
of use cases. Taking this into account, in this thesis we aim to improve on several elements of
overlay networks in SDN scenarios, but with the perspective of reactive southbound protocols.
Prior related work has explored how to use the Locator/ID Separation Protocol as a southbound
SDN protocol [9]. In this thesis we advance this line of research, exploring this type of overlay-based
SDN networks in three directions: data plane security, trust in distributed mapping systems, and
deployment in enterprise networks.
1.2 Background: Overlay Networks
Overlay networks are a technique to layer computer networks on top of other networks. Since they
don’t require upgrading all the network infrastructure, i.e., they can be incrementally deployed,
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they have been used to easily add new services or functionalities to exiting networks. Indeed, this
concept has been applied to a wide variety of use cases, such as resilient networks [12], network
mobility [13, 14], virtual networking [8], scalable extension of L2 domains [15, 16], peer-to-peer
systems [17, 18], multicast [19], QoS [20], improved routing [21], etc.
Since this thesis revolves around overlay networks and possible improvements to several of their
elements, here we present a reference architecture of an overlay network that will be used in this
thesis. Overlay-based networks consist of several independent elements that work collaboratively
(figure 1.1), namely:
Underlay: the bottom network layer, composed of routers that connect overlay endpoints. It is
commonly a plain IP network.
Overlay: the upper network layer. Its routers add and remove the headers used in the underlay
network (commonly know as en- or decapsulation routers, respectively).
Overlay endpoints: the collection of hosts that interact with the overlay, i.e. they are not aware
of the existence of the underlay.
Mapping System: a database server that maintains mappings of overlay endpoints to underlay
routers. We must note that the mapping system is optional (for example VXLAN-based
networks [22]). It can also be a key-value store, like in the Locator/ID Separation Protocol

















Figure 1.1: Reference architecture for overlay networks.
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1.3 Motivation
In the light of the evolution in networking research (software-defined networks, programmable data
planes, etc.) and trends on the global Internet (encryption of all communications, increase in
security threats, etc), some of the aforementioned elements require additional features or redesigns
to support emerging use cases and trends. Specifically, from bottom to top:
Underlay data plane security: it is common to encrypt all communications crossing the public
Internet, but the configuration of such encrypted streams is either via: (i) TLS keys derived
from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), or (ii) manual or automated configuration of IPsec
tunnels. In both cases the configuration is complex: TLS needs its own Certification Author-
ity, or trusting the global Internet PKI, while IPsec offers a wide range of configuration knobs
that can be overwhelming for inexperienced users.
Mapping system: typical mapping systems consist of a single (possibly redundant) server limited
to a single administrative domain. Mapping servers spanning different administrative domains
are not commonly deployed because they require complex configuration, such as LISP-TREE
[25], or lack secure authentication of the mappings, e.g. LISP-MSX [26].
Overlay networks in enterprises: in recent years, there has been few research regarding enter-
prise networks (with the notable exception of Zero Trust Networks [27]). Nevertheless, the
requirements of enterprise networks have kept evolving and posing new challenges which are
hard to meet by classical enterprise network architectures. We address this shortcoming by
investigating how overlay networks can be leveraged to address these challenges.
Future overlay networks for enterprise use cases: finally, taking into account the current
trends in networking, we ask which are the requirements of future enterprise networks and if
overlays play a role in it.
1.4 Objectives
The following list details the objectives of this thesis. Each objective aims to enhance or add new
features to a particular element of overlay networks (figure 1.2):
Underlay data plane security: design a simple control plane for the WireGuard VPN protocol
[28], in order to make it easier to establish multipoint encrypted overlay tunnels without the
burden of IPsec configuration.
Multi-domain mapping system: we intersect the aforementioned gap regarding multi-domain
mapping systems with emerging blockchain technologies. The goal is designing a mapping
system that can work in such environment, but preserving the control of the mappings to






























Figure 1.2: Thesis objectives with respect to the reference architecture.
among participants, and (ii) definition of trust architectures for such separated administrative
domains.
Mapping system applications to inter-domain routing: the problem of mapping IP prefixes
to AS numbers is equivalent to the mapping of overlay to underlay identifiers. Taking into
account this similarity, we investigate how a blockchain-based mapping system could be used
in the public Internet to disseminate IP prefix to AS mappings to enhance BGP routing
security.
Overlay networks in enterprises: study the requirements of current enterprise networks, and
evaluate if an architecture based on network overlays can address the challenges of these
networks. Specifically, we investigate how overlay networks in an enterprise scenario: (i)
increase scalability of the wireless data plane, (ii) reduce data plane state, and (iii) simplify
how segmentation is implemented.
Future overlay networks for enterprise use cases: finally, we elaborate on the requirements
of future enterprise networks and design a layered architecture based on network overlays and
the current Internet stack to address such requirements.
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1.5 Methodology
As described in section 1.7, this thesis is separated in two major parts. We used a different
methodology for each part due to their different characteristics:
Part I: Blockchain Applications to Address Assignment
This part contains all the topics related to a blockchain-based mapping system. Since blockchain
technologies are evolving continuously, and its application to production scenarios is not immediate,
we took an iterative approach (figure 1.3). In parallel, we (i) investigated the state of the art of
blockchain technology, and (ii) presented our ideas in the IETF and networking conferences to
gather feedback. Then we used the feedback to improve our idea, and repeated the process several
times until we believed it was sufficiently refined for publication.
Resarch blockchain




Figure 1.3: Methodology for the blockchain applications part.
Part II: Network Architectures for Enterprise Networks
This part encompasses the rest of the topics discussed previously: underlay data plane security,
current, and future overlay networks in enterprises. As opposed to the other part, this part is
directly applicable, so we leveraged a contact with a network vendor to understand the problem
and possible solutions (figure 1.4). Hence, here the methodology involved discussions with the
vendor about problems, possible solutions and relevant metrics to evaluate. Once these were clear,
we designed and evaluated prototypes, and published the results.
1.6 Contributions
As we mentioned previously, this thesis is divided in two major parts, with the following contribu-
tions:
Part I: Blockchain Applications to Address Assignment
 Analysis of the applicability of blockchain technologies to Internet address assignment, both
for the public Internet and in private networks.
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Figure 1.4: Methodology for the enterprise networks part.
 Discussion of the appropriate blockchain consensus algorithm for such use cases.
 Design and evaluation of a blockchain prototype for address assignment, again for both use
cases.
Part II: Network Architectures for Enterprise Networks
 Design and evaluation of a simple control plane to safely exchange the encryption keys of the
WireGuard VPN protocol, in order to build encrypted underlays.
 Analysis of the challenges and requirements of current enterprise networks.
 Design rationale and evaluation of a commercial solution for current enterprise networks,
based on SDN principles and network overlays.
 Analysis of the challenges of future enterprise networks, and design of a layered architecture
to support them.
1.7 Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided in two major parts. The first part, Blockchain for Internet Applications,
contains all the work related to mapping systems for different administrative domains, leveraging
blockchain technology. The second part, Architectures for Enterprise Networks, deals with secur-
ing the underlay segment of overlay networks, and applications of overlay networks in enterprise
networks, both present and future. Finally, the rest of this chapter presents the state of the art
related to the three major topics of this thesis: security of overlay networks, trust in distributed
mapping systems, and deployment in enterprise networks.
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1.7.1 Blockchain for Internet Applications
The first part is divided in three chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background on blockchain tech-
nologies and its core component, consensus algorithms. Then, chapter 3 discusses the application
of a mapping system based on blockchain to inter-domain routing security. This chapter includes:
(i) a detailed comparison with state of the art PKI-based systems for inter-domain routing security,
(ii) a thorough discussion on which consensus algorithm is the most appropriate for this use case,
and (iii) several considerations regarding the deployment of a blockchain in this scenario. It also
presents the design and evaluation of a prototype that leverages a simplified Proof of Stake consen-
sus algorithm. Finally, chapter 4 re-evaluates the previous proposition but in a scenario of several
collaborating enterprises that want to establish communications among themselves, i.e. a private
network. Again, this chapter discusses the benefits of leveraging blockchain, and the selection of
the appropriate consensus algorithm. Finally, it includes the design and evaluation of a prototype
of such blockchain.
1.7.2 Architectures for Enterprise Networks
The second part consists of three chapters. First, chapter 5 presents a simple control plane to secure
underlay networks, that leverages the WireGuard VPN protocol in the data plane. It also includes
the design and evaluation of a prototype. Then, chapter 6 discusses the challenges of current
enterprise networks, and proposes an architecture based on SDN principles, overlay networks, and
group-based policies to address them. Additionally, it evaluates such proposal regarding control
plane latency or reduction in data plane state, and details several lessons learned. Finally, chapter
7 builds on the current state of the art to propose a layered architecture based on overlays to
support the requirements of future enterprise networks.
1.8 State of the Art
1.8.1 Security
As we mentioned before, creating encrypted connections over the Internet - or other networks - is
not straightforward. In a nutshell, there are three possible approaches: IPsec tunnels, TLS VPNs,
or proprietary SDWAN (Software-Defined Wide Area Network) systems. Table 1.1 summarizes
their pros and cons. We have mainly focused on operational cost and supported features, such as
the configuration complexity, the kinds of traffic that they support, or their cost.
First, IPsec VPNs are convenient because they can encapsulate any kind of L3 traffic, and
they use regular IP routing. On the other hand, they are complex to configure, especially the key
distribution mechanism, or the cryptographic properties due to the wide range of cipher suites.
Second, in TLS-based VPNs we can leverage the web PKI to distribute keys easily, but on the flip
side we are limited to TCP flows, or we will need additional protocols such as DTLS (Datagram
TLS). Note here that it is also possible to deploy a private PKI, but this comes at the expense of
managing a Certification Authority and additional infrastructure. Finally, SDWANs, or dynamic
1.8. STATE OF THE ART 9
VPNs are commercial products that automate all the steps to create secure tunnels, and accept all
kinds of L3 traffic, but are costly due to their commercial aspect.
Approach Advantages Disadvantages
IPsec Encrypt any L3 traffic Complex configuration
TLS VPNs
Simplified key distribution Only for TCP flows, or
thanks to the web PKI use other protocols for UDP
SDWAN or Simple configuration,
Proprietary and costly
dynamic VPNs any L3 traffic
Table 1.1: Possible approaches for encrypted connections over the Internet.
In addition, there are other features that are becoming more relevant for certain users, like
mobility, that are not natively supported by these approaches. Therefore, it would be interesting
to design another solution that:
1. Is easy to configure
2. Supports all kinds of L3 traffic
3. Is inexpensive
4. Can handle additional features like mobility or multi-homing
In this context, WireGuard [28] is a new VPN protocol that aligns well with some of these
requirements: it is easy to configure (similar to SSH), works at L3, is open-source, and supports
mobility. However, it still presents some limitations, such as multi-homing or automating the
configuration of tunnels among several endpoints.
1.8.2 Trust
Currently, trust in the Internet is hierarchical and centralized, i.e. Certification Authorities (CA)
issue and revoke certificates, creating a hierarchy. Participants in this system have to trust the CAs,
which have total control over their downstream certificates (figure 1.5, left). On the other hand,
the emergence of Bitcoin and blockchains has offered a way to manage such trust in a completely
decentralized way: each participant has complete control of their private key. In other words, only
the owner of such private key can trigger any action associated with it (figure 1.5, right).
This decentralized approach has spurred a large amount of research on blockchains and de-
centralized ledgers, as well as several successful production blockchains (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc).
In the networking area, the usage of blockchain as a tool for networking use cases is at an early
stage. Although there is a remarkable amount of research papers, the most mature application are
decentralized naming systems, with equivalent functionality to that of the DNS [29, 30]. In other
words, the application of blockchain technology to networking scenarios is still a relatively new
research topic, with interesting challenges and trade-offs [31].
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Figure 1.5: Centralized trust (left) and distributed trust (right).
More specifically, with respect to overlay networks, this decentralization can be leveraged in
their control plane, i.e. the mapping system. Thus, we can let each endpoint individually manage
their mapping, as if it was a cryptographic coin. This decentralized approach creates new trust
architectures that have not been discussed yet. On the policy side, these new trust architectures
can mitigate centralization concerns about some systems running on the Internet, like DNSSEC or
the secure assignment of Internet number resources. On the technical side, blockchains offer several
properties that contrast with classical PKIs, such as auditability or simplified management, that
can be used to improve current mapping systems.
1.8.3 Deployment in Enterprise Networks
The last 10 years have seen a significant addition of functionalities to networks at L7, basically
leveraging HTTP [32]. Two key examples are Zero Trust Networks and Service Meshes. Zero
Trust Networking [27] is a novel approach to security in enterprise networks based on HTTP:
all communications between clients and servers run on HTTP. Then, an HTTP proxy that sits
between the clients and the servers, the access proxy, continuously verifies all connections to the
servers with data from a credentials database. Data is always encrypted with the use of HTTPS,
and the credentials database allows a wide range of access control policies, from a list of allowed
applications to blocking access depending on the version of the device OS.
Service Meshes [33, 34] also rely on HTTPS to transport data, but in data centers that are
running microservices. In this case, their main element is the sidecar proxy, that runs alongside
the microservices. This sidecar proxy intercepts all communications between the microservices,
monitors their status, and enforces policies. Moreover, their architecture presents some similarities
with SDN networks. For example, Istio is a centralized controller for service meshes running
the Envoy proxy [35], that can monitor traffic, enforce policies, route flows, etc. Both of these
improvements are, in fact, overlays based on HTTP.
On the contrary, L3 network overlays have seen fewer improvements. Nevertheless, tackling
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some problems at L3 instead of L7 offers three main advantages:
 Ability to protect the infrastructure (routers, etc) from attacks, eg. Distributed Denial of
Service.
 Finer grain control of the infrastructure, which brings performance improvements. This is
especially relevant for QoS policies.
 Support legacy equipment that does not use HTTP or work at L7.
We must also remark that L3 overlays present some drawbacks when compared with L7 overlays,
especially regarding deployment: while HTTP is commonly implemented in software and we need
to update fewer devices, L3 functionalities usually require hardware implementations in order to
run at line rate, and more devices have to be updated.
Taking this into account, we can see that the state of the art of L3 overlay networks does not
offer all the functionalities present in L7 technologies. At the same time, the latter cannot provide
the benefits of L3 overlays. Therefore, it would be interesting to bring some of these L7 overlay
features to L3 overlays. Specifically, in the context of enterprise networks there has been few
research on improving current architectures, with the notable exception of Zero Trust Networks.
We identified two main gaps in the state of the art:
 Applications of L3 overlays in enterprise networks in order to tackle their current challenges.
 How to add some of the L7 functionalities to L3 enterprise networks in order to:
– Include the aforementioned benefits of L3 overlays in new deployments.
– Tackle future requirements of such networks.
– Make deployment as simple as possible.
Interestingly, recent publications tend towards similar ideas. For example, Full Stack SDN
[36] proposes unifying network functions from L2 to L7 in order to increase performance and
efficiency. Another relevant idea in this proposal is creating different types of sockets depending
on the application using them, a concept that we reuse in chapter 7. More recently, Compositional
Network Architecture [37] presents a new approach to describe network architecture, that we have
found useful when designing a solution for future enterprise networks.
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2.1 Blockchain
In a nutshell, a blockchain is a distributed, secure, tamper-resistant, and append-only database.
Each blockchain participant stores a replica of the database. Participants exchange messages via a
peer-to-peer (P2P) network in order to: (i) modify the database, and (ii) distribute copies of the
database to new users. Usually, the blockchain database tracks the owner of some kind of asset
or token (coins for example). It is often regarded as a virtual ledger that records pairs of (owner,
asset) with specific rules that control state transitions, i.e. a replicated state machine. The typical
workflow is as follows:
1. Participants broadcast transactions, messages signed by their private key that alter the state
of the database.
2. All participants store transactions in a temporary storage. Invalid signatures or malformed
transactions are rejected.
3. At some fixed intervals in time, one of the participants (usually known as miner) puts all the
current transactions together and signs them, in a data structure known as block. Then, it
broadcasts the block to the P2P network.
4. The rest of the participants receive the block, validate the signature, and run the consensus
algorithm.
5. If the algorithm determines the block is correct, it is added right after the previous block,
thus updating the database state. The new block contains the hash of the previous block,
thus linking one block after another, and hence the term blockchain.
Two mechanisms provide security to the blockchain: the consensus algorithm and a chain of
signatures. On one hand, the consensus algorithm ensures that all participants agree on the same
blockchain state, thus providing data integrity and consistency. On the other hand, the chain of
signatures protects the individual ownership of each asset in the chain: assets are bound to its
owner by a public-private keypair. The public key identifies the owner, and the private key is used
to alter the state of the token or coin. Since the private key is solely owned by the user, only the
entity that controls this private key can alter the state of the asset. In order to transfer an asset,
the sending party creates a transaction: it signs the public key of the new owner with its private
key and broadcasts this signature to the network, hence the chain of signatures.
In a more broad sense, a blockchain can be described as a four-layer system (figure 2.1):
Peer-to-peer network: Transmits and receives new blocks and transactions.
Consensus algorithm: Enforces a particular and unique order of blocks in the chain, making
sure that all participants reach the same conclusion on which blocks get added at the end of

















Figure 2.1: Simplified blockchain operation in four layers.
Business logic: Allows specific state transitions, thereby enforcing a set of rules. The blockchain
rejects any transition that does not conform to this logic. For example, in Bitcoin it is not
possible to spend the same coin twice.
Database: Stores all the blocks in the chain and the current state, i.e. a list of public keys that
can sign new transactions, and their respective asset.
The original application of blockchain was Bitcoin, in which assets are coins and transactions
move money between different parties. However, thanks to blockchain’s properties, a wide range of
applications are possible. Some examples are notarization (tracking of land titles, academic degrees,
contracts, etc) or supply chain management. Regarding Internet applications, it is possible to create
naming systems (DNS-like), PKIs, access control for IoT devices, or applications to BGP security.
Finally, another important concept are forks. Depending on the consensus algorithm, it is
possible that at some moments in time there are multiple chains. In such situation, the consensus
algorithm determines which fork will become part of the chain, and discards the rest.
2.1.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
The most relevant advantages of a blockchain are:
Decentralized: No central entity controls the blockchain, it is shared among all participants.
No CAs, CRLs or certificates needed: Generally speaking, blockchains do not need digital
certificates, Certification Authorities (CA) or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL). However,
some consensus algorithms use them as a basis for their operation.
Simplified rekeying: A key rollover can be performed easily by issuing a new transaction. This
transaction has to allocate the assets to a new keypair controlled by the same holder. This
18 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
process can be performed without involving any third party.
Censorship-resistant: Since the control of a transaction is completely under the holder of the
private key, the revocation of an asset without the legitimate holder’s permission involves
obtaining its private key. Even if the private key of the previous owner was compromised,
ownership of the current transaction is still preserved, as opposed to the compromise of a
CA’s private key (or a misbehaving CA).
Limited prior trust: It is not required to trust other nodes. However, it is worth noting that
some consensus algorithms rely on limited levels of trust.
Simplified management: in situations that do not require a CA, we can avoid their management
overhead.
Auditable: The transactions can be tracked back in the blockchain to determine if they originate
from the legitimate holder.
No single point of failure: again, due to the fact that each user controls its private key, the
compromise of a user’s key does not compromise the entire system. This starkly contrasts
with the compromise of a CA, which can potentially invalidate all downstream certificates.
Simplified state update: PKIs need specific subsystems to update its state (e.g. issue/revoke
certificates). On the other hand, in a blockchain all these operations are embedded in it
thanks to its transactional nature.
Tamper-resistant: Since data can be only added but never modified, we can detect attempts to
alter previous records.
Non-repudiation: All nodes share a common, immutable view on the status of the blockchain,
which provides a non-repudiation mechanism.
Privacy: Entities participating in the blockchain can achieve privacy using anonymous keys, i.e.
randomly-generated keys not related to their identity. However, (i) a new keypair should be
generated for each new transaction in order to prevent tracking, (section 10 of [38]), and (ii)
it is possible to link keys to users depending on the nature of the assets in the chain.
Among its disadvantages we must remark:
No cryptographic guarantees: Some consensus algorithms do not rely on strong cryptographic
guarantees. As opposed to PKI-based systems that rely on strong and well-established cryp-
tographic mechanisms, consensus algorithms ultimately rely on the good behavior of a signif-
icant portion of their users.
Costly bootstrapping: When a node is activated it has to download and verify the entire block-
chain.
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Large storage: The size of the blockchain keeps growing forever, because data blocks are always
added. This may result in scalability issues.
Slow updates: New transactions have to be verified, added to a block and received by all nodes.
This results in a delay since the transaction is created until it is finally available to all the
nodes. This delay will depend on the consensus algorithm, the block creation rate, and the
network latency.
Complex revocation: once a transaction is added to the blockchain, only the recipient can revert
it. This situation is not always desirable, for example, in case the private key is lost or stolen.
On the other hand, it is possible to devise mechanism to cope with this limitation (section
2.2).
Finally, table 2.1 presents a comparison of PKIs and blockchains.
Concept PKI Blockchain
Revocation Complex management Not supported natively
Trust Required Limited or not required
Auditability Complex Built-in
Rekeying Cumbersome Easy
Technology maturity Very mature Early stages
Security Fully tested In progress
Table 2.1: Comparison between classical PKIs and blockchains
2.1.2 Relationship to Security on the Internet
From an Internet security perspective blockchains represent a major breakthrough. Until now,
the only way to provide information security and privacy across the Internet was by means of
PKI systems (Public Key Infrastructure), that is, hierarchies of certificates with a Certification
Authority (CA) on top.
With blockchain, we can move away from these centralized architectures to more decentralized
ones, in what could be called flexible trust. We can balance power between users and authorities
along a line, with PKIs on one end (centralized: the CA has full control), and Bitcoin-like on the
other (decentralized: only users can alter its own state). Between these two ends, there is a wide
range of options that trade-off trust (centralization) for decentralization (figure 2.2).
This is because with blockchain we can enforce any set of rules its participants agree upon. For
example, we could sit in a middle point between a PKI and Bitcoin: users always own their assets,
but a central authority can revoke them only in special situations (that need to be proven in the
blockchain). This depends heavily on the use case.







Figure 2.2: Balance between complete centralization or decentralization.
2.2 Consensus Algorithms for Blockchains
The consensus algorithm is the most critical subsystem in any blockchain, because it ultimately
determines a wide range of performance and security parameters, such as time between blocks,
maximum number of adversaries, computational complexity/cost, etc. This relevance has caused
a huge amount of research in this area, in order to improve previous algorithms and, in turn,
blockchain implementations.
We could define a consensus algorithm as a set of rules that ensure agreement among all the
participants in the blockchain, so that they reach exactly the same conclusion regarding its state
at any point in time. Formally speaking, consensus algorithms are a new solution to the Byzantine
Generals Problem (section 2.2.1), usually know as Byzantine Fault Tolerance.
In this section we provide a high-level overview of all the available consensus algorithms, out-
lining their main benefits and disadvantages. This list is not exhaustive, it rather aims to group
the algorithms by families based on the fundamental idea behind each one, with some examples.
Interested readers can refer to more detailed surveys on the topic [39, 40].
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation: Byzantine Fault Tolerance
From a research perspective consensus algorithms are a novel way to resolve the Byzantine Generals’
Problem [41]. We can find a similar formalization dating back to 1975 [42]. In this problem, a
group of generals have to agree on the best moment to attack an enemy city at the same time.
If each general attacks at a different moment, their chances of winning are drastically reduced.
The generals are located in different areas surrounding the city and can communicate each other.
However, their messages can be intercepted and delayed, modified or dropped. Which protocol
should they use to agree on the best moment to attack the city?
In their seminal 1999 paper [43], Castro and Liskov introduced a practical solution based on
digital signatures that could work in an asynchronous environment like the Internet but with
lower latency that previous approaches. Indeed, this algorithm is the foundation of several other
consensus algorithms [44]. For example, Raft [45], which is also used in some blockchains [46].
2.2.2 Proof of Work
Concept
Proof of Work (PoW) consensus algorithms consume an external resource when creating a new
block for the chain. In other words, miners have to spend some resource (work) to produce a block
2.2. CONSENSUS ALGORITHMS FOR BLOCKCHAINS 21
eligible to be added. Usually the kind of work is computationally intensive or hard to replicate,
but easy to verify. Each block is assigned a score according to the work required to create it. Forks
in the chain accumulate the work of each block in it. Finally, the definitive chain is the one with
higher accumulated work. Note that PoW decouples the control of the chain from its users, because
in some cases miners don’t need to be an active user of the blockchain to be able to mine blocks.
Example
Bitcoin [38] is the canonical example of PoW, in which the resource are CPU cycles: miners have
to generate a block with a hash that starts with a fixed amount of zeroes. They do this with brute
force, by sequentially increasing a nonce included in the block until they find the required hash.
On the other hand, the verification is trivial because members only need to calculate the hash of
the block and determine if it starts with the required amount of zeroes (which is advertised in the
P2P network and periodically recalculated).
At the same time, these hard-to-find hashes prevent the modification of the block or the chain,
because altering a block changes its hash, and in turn the hash of its succeeding blocks (each block
contains the hash of its predecessors). This allows detecting attempts to alter the blockchain.
Variants
It has been proposed using other resources instead of compute power, for example disk space [47],
or algorithms to find prime numbers [48].
2.2.3 Proof of Stake
Concept
Proof of Stake (PoS) couples the blockchain users and miners. In such scheme, the new block
signer is selected randomly from the pool of current users (public keys). The selection is weighted
according to each user’s number of coins/tokens, so users with more coins are more likely to add
more blocks. The underling idea is that the more coins a user has, the lesser the incentive to tamper
the blockchain.
Example
NEM is an active blockchain that uses Proof of Importance [49], a variation of PoS that takes into
consideration, apart from the stake, the dynamics of the transactions (topology or frequency).
Variants
PoS algorithms are an active area of research in which we can find many proposals exploring
different angles. Due to several criticisms regarding its correctness and security [50, 51], a lot of
proposals focus on designing provably secure algorithms, such as Algorand [52] or Ouroboros [53],
among many others. Some improve on previous protocols like Snow White [54], HoneyBadgerBFT
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[55], or DFINITY [56]. Finally, other algorithms leverage additional tools: punishment mechanisms
to nodes that don’t adhere to the protocol, like Ethereum Casper [57], delegating block production
to a subset of stakeholders, such as Delegated PoS in EOS [58], or the simplified termination
mechanism in Tendermint [59].
2.2.4 Network of Trust
Concept
These algorithms leverage a user’s social network by means of carefully selecting which users are
trusted (similarly to PGP keyrings). Users only accept messages from peers they trust. This creates
groups of users that trust each other, and also intersections between these groups. Thanks to these
intersections, and after several voting rounds, nodes reach consensus regarding which transactions
will be accepted. Figure 2.3 presents a simplified example, in which users from Group A can trust





Figure 2.3: Simplified principle of operation of network of trust algorithms.
Example
The Stellar blockchain uses an algorithm with the same name [60], that creates groups of nodes
called quorum that later reach agreement after a few voting rounds.
Variants
Ripple [61] is another example of such type of algorithms that operates similarly to Stellar.
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2.2.5 Graph-based
Concept
These algorithms cannot be considered exactly for blockchains, because they do not store data in
the form of blocks (chunks of transactions). However, the end result is the same, both in terms
of blockchain functionality (maintaining a shared ledger), and consensus algorithm (agreeing on
a shared state). The fundamental difference between a classical blockchain and a graph chain is
the absence of blocks: these ledgers construct a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) in which nodes
are transactions and edges are references to previous transactions. In this case, the consensus
algorithm depends heavily on the specific blockchain. It usually boils down to an algorithm that
selects which transactions have to be referenced, and that ensures that only legitimate transactions
are referenced.
Example
An example of such kind of algorithms is Tangle, used in the IOTA blockchain [62]. It leverages
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to select which transactions will be approved. Since
the security of this method depends on the computational power of a potential attacker, the IOTA
Foundation has been running a centralized coordinator to ensure correctness, but plans to eliminate
it soon [63].
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3.1 Introduction
Inter-domain routing security is a pressing issue in today’s Internet. In a nutshell, inter-domain
routing security encompasses the correct announcement and propagation of IP prefixes across the
Autonomous Systems (AS) that conform the Internet. Currently, the protocol that communicates
these announcements is BGP (Border Gateway Protocol [64]). BGP allows ISPs and other Internet
companies to announce routes, i.e. how to reach a specific destination. BGP security is typically
based on manual and careful configuration via out-of-band mechanisms where network operators
communicate each other which prefixes to announce. Hence, an accidental misconfiguration or a
malicious attacker controlling a BGP router can disrupt normal Internet routing [65]. This can
lead to denial of Internet services, traffic redirection, data leaks, etc.
One of the most relevant attacks to the inter-domain routing infrastructure is known as prefix
hijacking. Since BGP messages are not authenticated, it is easy to perform a BGP hijack by
forging BGP announcements and propagating them to neighboring ASes. There is a long history
of prefix hijacks on the Internet. As an example of this, in 2008 the Pakistani government ordered
national ISPs to censor YouTube. Due to a configuration error, they attracted large portions of
non-Pakistani YouTube traffic which resulted in the service being down during 2 hours worldwide
[66].
Given the severity of these attacks, the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) has designed a
solution to Inter-domain routing security by means of the RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastruc-
ture [67]), a PKI repository to record the legitimate owners of IP prefixes, AS numbers and ROAs
(Route Origin Authorization, a certificate to allow an AS to announce an IP prefix). Despite these
efforts, RPKI deployment is slower than expected: only ∼14% of the total /24 IPv4 address blocks
owned by the five Internet Registries are protected by the RPKI (figure 3.1).
There are several reasons that contribute to this limited deployment, related to technical issues
but also to policy aspects. By policy aspects we refer to RPKI’s inherent centralization, that leaves
ultimate control of Internet routing to the RPKI Certification Authorities (CAs), in this case the
five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) [69]. This centralized security model does not align well
with the current situation of the Internet, which is at a crossroads with different competing visions
on how it should be [70], and risks splintering into isolated networks known as splinternet [71]. In
other words, we face a dilemma between centralization and decentralization.
On the technical side, the RPKI presents various obstacles to widespread deployment: manage-
ment complexity (PKIs are cumbersome to manage, e.g. when performing a key refresh), implemen-
tation challenges [72], and concerns on transparency [73]. In addition, deploying these extensions
is not trivial and requires trained staff [74] and financial investment.
In the light of this situation, we propose securing Inter-domain routing by storing IP address
allocation data in a blockchain. Thanks to its decentralized nature, we can distribute trust among
all of its participants (i.e. all the owners of IP addresses). This way, each entity maintains its
independence but at the same time they have a common framework to agree on routing security,
thereby reducing the incentives to isolate parts of it. In addition, we can create flexible trust models
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Figure 3.1: Amount of RIPE’s IPv4 address space covered by ROAs, in /24 units. Of the five
Registries, RIPE is the one with highest RPKI adoption [68].
that capture the complexities of geopolitics and replace single points of control (CAs) with global
agreement (blockchain consensus algorithms).
Moreover, with a blockchain we can address the aforementioned technical drawbacks: (i) sim-
plify management, especially regarding common PKI operations such as key rollover, (ii) offer
auditability: blockchain’s append-only ledger can detect possible configuration errors even before a
modification[75], and (iii) create a consistent vision of the state that does not depend on additional
systems (i.e. PKI Certificate Revocation Lists, CRLs), because all the required operations can be
embedded in the blockchain.
This chapter describes IPchain, a blockchain to store IP address allocation and delegation data.
The underlying argument is that IP prefixes are very similar to cryptographic coins, e.g. they are
unique or can be divided into smaller amounts. Just like in Bitcoin users send money, participants
in IPchain can transfer IP addresses. For example, an ISP can store its IP prefixes in the chain,
along with the originating AS number. Then, other ISPs can use this data to verify the origin of
BGP messages associated with these prefixes.
We have developed a prototype to assess the feasibility of our proposal, focusing on scalability
and performance. Such prototype follows the blockchain transaction paradigm to allocate and
delegate IP prefixes. We leverage a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm, i.e. select randomly the
signer of the next block among all participants, weighted by their number of IP addresses. Finally,
we performed an experimental evaluation: we converted the IP prefixes of the Internet Registries
into blockchain transactions and stored approximately 70% of them in a chain of 2.5 GB.
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3.2 IP Address Allocation and RPKI Architecture
The allocation of IP addresses follows a hierarchical scheme. It is usually formed of three tiers
(figure 3.2): the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), the Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs) and ISPs. Initially, IANA holds all the address space, since it is charge of Internet numbers.
Then, it transfers large blocks of addresses to the RIRs (1). Afterwards, the Registries delegate
smaller blocks to their customers, usually ISPs (2). Finally, ISPs can delegate blocks to their
customers (3). The procedure is equivalent for AS numbers.
Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA)
(1)






Figure 3.2: IP address allocation hierarchy.
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is an IETF-defined standard to authenticate
the legitimate owners of IP prefixes and AS numbers. The RPKI replicates the aforementioned IP
prefix delegation structure with digital certificates, which authenticate the allocation of IP prefixes
and AS numbers (figure 3.3). In summary, there are two types of certificates: Resource Certificates
(RC) and Route Origin Authorizations (ROA). RCs bind IP prefixes or AS numbers to a public
key (1), and ROAs specify which AS number can advertise a particular IP prefix (3). It is also
possible to sub-allocate resources to other entities (2) or issue more than one ROA (4).
This way, network operators download the certificates and use them to verify BGP announce-
ments. If the (IP prefix, AS number) pair in the BGP message does not match the corresponding
certificate in the RPKI, the announcement is considered invalid.
In this architecture, trust is centralized in the five RIRs, who act as CAs and own the Trust
Anchor used to validate all downstream certificates.
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Figure 3.3: Sample RPKI certificate hierarchy.
3.3 Why blockchain?
This section we discusses the advantages provided by a blockchain when compared to the state of
the art solution, the RPKI. We focus both on technical and policy benefits. By policy we refer to
the possibility of modifying current trust architectures in order to better align the interests of all
parties.
3.3.1 Technical Advantages
Consistent vision of the state: Both in Bitcoin and the RPKI, we need a mechanism to update
the state and notify all participants, so that all of them agree on the same data. While the
RPKI makes use of specific protocols to update state (e.g. RPKI Publication Protocol [76] or
Certificate Revocation Lists), in a blockchain this can be directly encoded in its transactions.
Auditability: Since blockchain transactions cannot be eliminated, we can easily detect updates,
for example, when a new ROA is issued for the same IP address. Moreover, this persistence
prevents unwanted deletions that could affect other users [75]. Even though we can build
auditability systems for PKIs like a Public Notary [77], a blockchain has this feature out of
the box.
Simplified management: Common RPKI operations, such as key refresh or certificate revocation
are complex and require multiple steps or dedicated subsystems. On the other hand, a
blockchain makes those operations much more simple, usually it is only necessary to add a
new transaction. In a PKI, when we perform a key rollover we have to re-sign all downstream
certificates. For example, RFC 6489 is specifically devoted to key rollover in the RPKI [78].
In addition, if we want to revoke certificates we need manifests and CRLs. On the contrary,
in a blockchain we can perform these two operations with a new transaction.
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Privacy: Blockchain transactions are not linked to the user’s identity, just to a public key. It is
worth noting that the RPKI also offers privacy, because its certificates do not contain identity
information.
3.3.2 Policy Advantages
The main benefit of using blockchain in our scenario is the decentralization of trust. As mentioned
earlier, RPKI users (typically ISPs) have to trust the five RPKI CAs (one for each RIR), which
act as central points of trust, and can arbitrarily revoke any downstream certificate [69]. This
situation can be uncomfortable for ISPs, because IP prefixes are a key asset for most of them (their
connectivity is based on proper attribution of IP addresses).
On the contrary, with a blockchain we can tackle these concerns, because their inherent de-
centralization leaves control of resources to the owner of the public-private key pair. Thus, in
a blockchain we can effectively shift the power from CAs to the users, so that after the prefix
allocation, users do not depend anymore on the actions of the CA.
Moreover, due to the fact that we can enforce complex policies inside a blockchain, it is possible
to define flexible trust schemes between RIRs and users (c.f. section 3.5.5), i.e. a middle ground
between complete centralization and decentralization.
3.4 Which consensus algorithm?
Consensus algorithms are probably the most important building block of a blockchain. This section
details the motivations when deciding which one to use for the use case of securing IP address
allocation and delegation.
3.4.1 Proof of Work
In Proof of Work (PoW), nodes in the blockchain have to solve a complex mathematical problem
to add a block, thus requiring some computational effort. The definitive chain is the one with most
computing power spent to create.
Despite its widespread usage, PoW is not suitable for our use case. The main reason is that the
security of a PoW chain is directly linked to computing power. In other words, if we can accumulate
enough computing power, we can rewrite the blockchain with false data (e.g., incorrect delegations
of IP addresses). This is very expensive in blockchains accounting for millions of participants (like
in Bitcoin or Ethereum), due to the large amount of computing power powering them. However,
in our situation this kind of attack is feasible: consider that the current number of Autonomous
Systems in the Internet is only around 65k [79].
In addition, PoW blockchains (typically) decouple its users from the management of the chain,
i.e., we can transfer money in Bitcoin without having to create blocks. This user-miner separation
can impact negatively on the chain, since the capability to add new blocks and the security of
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the chain itself depend on the computing power of the participants (miners), which is not always
aligned with their interest in the well-being of the blockchain (users).
3.4.2 Proof of Stake for IP prefix allocation and delegation
In a Proof of Stake (PoS [80]) blockchain, participants with more assets/coins are more likely to
add blocks. Like in PoW, the algorithm randomly selects one participant to add a block, but it
takes into account how many coins each user has. The underlying idea is that users with more
coins (stake) have an incentive to contribute in the chain because they are its primary users.
Taking into consideration these particularities, we advocate that PoS is the most suitable option
for our use case, due to three key reasons.
First, in PoS only blockchain users can make modifications, i.e. we don’t depend on external
actors and their computing power. This is of paramount importance in our scenario, because users
that own a large quantity of IP address will have higher chance to add blocks. Usually, such
participants also profit from an Internet that operates properly, so they have a clear motivation
to keep its normal operation. In other words, blockchain users do not have any incentive to forge
information because they would suffer the consequences: an insecure Internet [81].
Second, with a PoS algorithm we can reduce the risk of takeover, i.e. buying a large amount of
assets in order to accumulate enough stake to rewrite the blockchain. In our context, this means
buying a large amount of IP prefixes from other participants. However, it is not clear that an
attacker may be able to perform such attack, because the other users lack a clear reason to sell
their IP addresses: as we mentioned previously, they are an important economical asset for most
ISPs.
And third, with a PoS algorithm we benefit from a low computational cost and we don’t need
special hardware. These two facts lower the entry barrier for new participants in the blockchain.
3.4.3 PoS Resistance to Monopolies
Nevertheless, PoS presents a fundamental weakness: monopolies. If a participant controls half or
more of the assets, it will eventually take control of the blockchain. In order to determine if this
could happen in a chain for IP addresses, we have calculated how many addresses own the five RIRs
and selected countries or political unions. Figure 3.4 presents the percentage of IPv4 addresses of
each, derived from IP to AS mappings [82], and CAIDA AS to organization mappings [83]. As
the figure shows, no country or RIR owns more than 40% of addresses, rendering PoS resistant
to monopolies in this scenario. Note that we are assuming that a collusion of two or more of the
presented entities is highly unlikely. A similar analysis focusing on individual companies reveals
that the one with most prefixes holds 3.5% of all the advertised IPv4 addresses.
Furthermore, in some PoS algorithms we can configure the minimum number of participants
needed to create a monopoly, e.g. a participant needs to accumulate at least 75% of the total
stake in order to successfully perform an attack. This way, we can adapt to the changing political
situation of the Internet, increasing this threshold if required (section 3.6.1).






















































Figure 3.4: Percentage of IPv4 addresses of each RIR. Selected countries/unions are also included
in the corresponding RIR.
3.4.4 Network of Trust Consensus Algorithms
These kind of algorithms, such as Stellar [60], are based on a user’s trust relationships with other
users (section 2.2.4). Although these algorithms present an interesting alternative, we consider
them less suitable for IPchain than Proof of Stake, due to two key reasons. First, they typically re-
quire some kind of certificate-based identification system for the nodes, thus losing one of IPchain’s
fundamental advantages. And second, due to the Internet’s decentralized nature, the trust rela-
tionships among Internet participants (mainly ISPs) are not fully well known [84, 85], making it
difficult to ensure consensus among all the players. Nevertheless, these algorithms remain as a
possible alternative and a relevant research question.
3.5 Architecture of IPchain
In this section we describe the architecture of IPchain regarding workflow, intended deployment,
PoS consensus algorithm, and solutions to recover lost keys.
3.5.1 IP prefixes as coins
IP prefixes share some fundamental characteristics with the coins or assets we find in any blockchain:
 They are unambiguously allocated to the participants.
 Can be transferred (delegated) between them.
 Can be divided up to a certain limit.
 Cannot be assigned to two participants at the same time.
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Figure 3.5: Transaction workflow example
Taking into account these similarities, we can devise a blockchain to record and transfer IP
prefixes, equivalently to a financial blockchain. By chaining different transactions we can replicate
the allocation hierarchy of the RPKI in a blockchain and create a consistent registry of owners
of IP prefixes. Figure 3.5 shows the intended deployment of such blockchain: first, IANA, as the
top-level regulator of Internet numbers writes transactions assigning all the address space to itself
(1). Ideally, this first transaction is encoded in the genesis block. Second, IANA transfers large
blocks of addresses to the RIRs (2). Third, the Registries allocate prefixes to ISPs (3), which in
turn delegate them to their customers (4). Finally, customers bind metadata to their prefixes, such
as their AS number (5).
The genesis block contains all existing prefixes, so any participant can download the blockchain,
validate all the transactions and determine the legitimate owner of a particular prefix.
3.5.2 Overview
Figure 3.6 presents a sample of IPchain’s workflow. First, router r1 writes in the chain its legitimate
prefix and associated AS number (1). Now, consider that the announcement propagates through the
network and is modified by the rough router (center). When router r3 receives the announcement
of 150/8 to AS2, it can check in the blockchain (2) if 150/8 should be originated by AS2. In this
case 150/8 should be originated by AS1, so the announcement is deemed invalid.
It is worth noting that all the blockchain processes occur offline (equivalently to the RPKI) in a
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standard server, so they don’t need to be co-located with the router. Usually, the server generates

















Figure 3.6: Sample usage scenario of IPchain.
3.5.3 PoS Consensus Algorithm
As mentioned in section 3.4.2, PoS fits the requirements of our use case. In this scenario, the
selection of the next block signer works in the following way:
1. Count the number of addresses of each participant
2. Generate a random number
3. Select one of the participants with the random number weighted by their number of addresses
We must remark that the random number is generated in a distributed fashion, i.e. participants
exchange several messages to create the same random number. This way, they will also select the
same signer. The key challenge in a PoS algorithm is creating a publicly verifiable random number
in a distributed environment. We can find examples in the literature on how to this, such as the
Round-Robin Random Number Generator [86] or the Shamir Secret Sharing scheme [87]. Recently,
new algorithms have been proposed specifically designed for blockchains (section 2.2.3), such as
Ouroboros [53] or Snow White [54].
Usually, PoW and PoS algorithms include some kind of reward for new blocks, like Bitcoin,
or a punishment for misbehavior, e.g. Ethereum Casper [57]. In our scenario, we consider both
unnecessary: first, the reward is the security of the routing infrastructure; apart from the fact
that a PoS algorithm does not require a significant financial investment. Second, in our case a
punishment would mean removing the IP addresses of a participant, however, this is very unlikely
in real life and can have harsh consequences.
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3.5.4 Supported Operations
We define the following operations for IPchain, that are equivalent to those in the RPKI:
Allocate: Assign a block of IP prefixes to an entity, allowing it to further allocate or delegate it
to other entities.
Delegate: Like Allocate, but without the permission to further allocate prefixes to other entities.
A delegated prefix cannot be further allocated.
Metadata: Add additional data to a prefix, e.g. AS number authorized to announce the prefix.
3.5.5 Flexible Trust: Revocation
Blockchain transactions are irreversible, i.e. once we have allocated an IP prefix to an entity, we
cannot undo or modify this transaction. Generally speaking, this is desirable from the point of view
of the ISPs, but there are some situations when it is necessary to reclaim a block of addresses, e.g.
stolen or lost keys, human error, misuse, etc. In addition, IP addresses are a finite good and must
be preserved: the loss of an IP prefix impacts the whole community, as opposed to a cryptographic
coin: only its owner is affected.
Taking into account that in a blockchain we can define an arbitrary set of rules, we can design
some schemes to recover a block of addresses, but at the same time preserve the decentralization
in any blockchain. For instance, we can let a widely recognized third party (e.g. IANA) resolve
disputes between conflicting parties by issuing a special transaction that reallocates the resource.
Other mechanisms are possible: time-limited allocations, multi-signature transactions, etc.
Nevertheless, the revocation approach should be agreed among the relevant players (IANA,
RIRs, ISPs, institutions, etc). It is worth noting that behind these mechanisms there is a funda-
mental trade-off between complete centralization (traditional PKI, trust the upstream provider)
and total decentralization like in a blockchain (section 2.2).
3.5.6 Other considerations
Rekeying
Rekeying is a common operation in the RPKI and involves re-signing all downstream certificates
with the new key. On the contrary, this operation is greatly simplified in blockchain: we only have
to add a new transaction re-allocating the IP prefix to a new keypair controlled by ourselves. In
addition, since transactions are independent from each other, we can perform rekeying operations
individually without affecting other users.
Privacy
Since IP addresses are linked to their owners’ public key, it is not possible to identify the holder
only with the data in the blockchain. In that sense, blockchain offers a similar degree of privacy to
the RPKI.
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IPv6 support
Since IP version 4 and 6 prefixes are currently being used, IPchain needs to support both. However,
this is not trivial because there are more IPv6 addresses (128 bits) than IPv4 (32 bits). In a PoS
blockchain, randomly selecting from both pools of addresses would create an imbalance of power
between and v6 and v4 owners (the first would create much more blocks than the latter).
Taking this into account, we suggest never mixing v4 and v6 addresses in IPchain, but create
alternatively blocks of v4 or v6 transactions. For example, even blocks contain v4 transactions and
are signed by the owner of a v4 prefix, and the same for odd blocks and v6 transactions. This
solution does not require two different blockchains and isolates v4 and v6 stake.
Finally, it should be noted that, due to the huge size of v6 address space, large parts remain
unallocated and still owned by IANA (less than 0.5% of v6 address space has been allocated to the
RIRs). This space should be ignored (not counted) to avoid IANA signing nearly all v6 blocks and
thus, preventing an IANA monopoly.
3.6 Implementation
We have built an open-source prototype and made it publicly available [88]. We did not to fork an
existing blockchain implementation since they do not fit our needs, particularly regarding the PoS
consensus algorithm.
The IPchain prototype is written in Python (figure 3.7), and supports typical blockchain op-
erations: receive new blocks and transactions, validate new blocks and add them to the chain,
maintain a pool of unconfirmed transactions, create new blocks, etc. It also implements the op-
erations defined in section 3.5.4 for both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. With the aim to ease user
interaction, the prototype reads new transactions from a file, signs and sends them to the network,
and includes a keystore to encrypt the user’s private keys.
In addition, the prototype interfaces with OpenOverlayRouter (OOR [89]). OOR is an open-
source implementation of the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP, RFC 6830 [90]) that creates
programmable overlay network tunnels. OOR leverages IPchain to retrieve metadata related to the
IP prefixes that is used in some LISP signaling messages. In other words, the prototype is designed
to store LISP mapping system information. As such, apart from supporting the allocation and
delegation of IP prefixes, we extended the transaction capability to also allow users to add LISP
metadata with additional types of transactions. Specifically, the locator of a prefix or the IP address
of the Map Server containing the mappings. In what follows, we describe relevant modules of the
prototype.
Data Structures: IPchain builds on Ethereum’s account system, which maps pairs of blockchain
addresses with the associated IP addresses. Transactions are encoded as modifications to
accounts. We chose this model instead of Bitcoin’s UTXO because it requires less storage
and data access is easier. We modified the PyEthereum Trie, DB, Utils and Transactions





























Figure 3.7: IPchain prototype architecture.
Peer-to-Peer Network: The P2P module implements all communication functions in a broadcast-
all fashion, leveraging Pyhton’s Twisted library for network communication [92]. Since it does
not connect all the nodes between themselves, a Distributed Hash Table [93] keeps track of
the last block number, so that if a node misses some blocks it can request them.
OOR interface: A simple request-response interface connects OOR and IPchain via local sockets.
OOR sends queries requesting the metadata associated with a specific IP address. IPchain
maintains an internal tree that maps IP prefixes to blockchain addresses, so it can locate the
associated account in the state tree, retrieve the metadata and send the response back to
OOR.
3.6.1 PoS Consensus Algorithms
Algorithm Selection
We can find several PoS algorithms already in production systems, such as NEM’s Proof of Im-
portance [49] or Ethereum Casper [57]. NEM’s Proof of Importance is a modified version of PoS
that takes into account not only the stake but also the transaction graph topology and frequency.
However, in IPchain we cannot rely on the frequency of transactions like NEM because our scenario
is not as dynamic as financial systems, both from a topology and frequency standpoint.
Another promising PoS algorithm is Ethereum’s Casper, still in development. However, Casper
uses a punishment mechanism that, as we described earlier in section 3.5.3, is not suitable for our
use case. Other proposed algorithms, like Algorand [52] or Ouroboros [53], are a good fit, but we
were unable to find an open-source implementation.
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Algorithm Implementation
We finally leveraged part of the DFINITY blockchain PoS algorithm for our chain [56]. This chain
operates a complex three-step algorithm that combines a Decentralized Random Number Generator
(DRNG), a block notarization process and a finalization process. The two latter are used to resolve
chain forks and achieve higher scalability. For simplicity, our prototype only uses the DRNG and

























Figure 3.8: DKG (top) and BLS (bottom) operation.
The DRNG builds on the well-know topic of threshold signatures (figure 3.8), in which a group
of participants jointly generate a group key and a set of private keys, known as Distributed Key
Generation (DKG). Later, they can use these private keys to sign a message; however, the signature
is only valid if a portion of the participants (defined by a tunable parameter, the Threshold) have
signed the message. The scheme we use there is the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS). The message is
commonly know as share because it is a part of the whole signature.
In the blockchain context, we calculate the random number as the hash of the signed message
(n.b. all participants sign the same message). Due to the fact that we cannot recover the signed
message unless Threshold participants have signed it, we can be sure no single participant can
manipulate this number. We repeat this process for each new block to get a fresh random number to
select the next block signer. In addition, the Threshold signature scheme offers two key advantages:
(i) since it is not necessary that all the participants sign the message, we can tolerate several
malicious or disconnected nodes, and (ii) we can adjust the Threshold to tune the upper limit
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of malicious or disconnected participants depending on the current situation, as we mentioned in
section 3.4.3.
Finally, our prototype also: (i) repeats the private key generation process after a predetermined
number of blocks to refresh the public and private keys, and to take into account new participants
that have been added in previous blocks, and (ii) in order to scale more easily, not all blockchain
addresses take part in the DRNG, we select some of them with the previously generated random
number.
3.7 Experimental evaluation
We carried out several experiments in order to determine the applicability of IPchain in real life.
We measured several blockchain metrics to characterize the performance and scalability of IPchain,
focusing on six key metrics: (i) throughput, (ii) block time, (iii) bootstrap time, (iv) chain size,
(v) block time depending on BLS threshold, and (vi) DKG refresh time. Finally, we present an
analytical estimation of the required storage in the long-term.
3.7.1 Blockchain Metrics
Throughput
For this test, we encoded in the genesis block the entire v4 and v6 address space, splitting them in
large blocks of addresses, similarly to IANA’s registries of v4 and v6 address space [94]. In order
to simulate the typical allocation scheme of IP prefixes (section 3.2), we generated three groups of
transactions. The first one referenced prefixes in the genesis block and split them uniformly into
smaller prefixes, and the second also created smaller prefixes but referencing the transactions from
the first group. Finally, we extracted the prefixes for the third level directly from the publicly
available lists of the Registries’ address allocations [95], with the final goal of storing real prefixes
in the chain. In total, we generated around 380k transactions (82k in levels 1 and 2, 298k in level
3 - two thirds of the 430k in the RIR files).
We set up a single node (VM with two associated virtual CPUs, Intel Xeon Platinum @ 3
GHz, 4 GB RAM) with these transactions, all the associated keys and a configured DKG with 100
keys and 66% BLS Threshold, 40s block time and 2 MB block size. We can see the result of this
experiment in figure 3.9, which plots the number of transactions per block, separated into v4 and
v6 transactions. We can see two distinct phases in the experiment: before and after block ∼1580.
In this moment we increased the transaction injection speed from 1tx/s to 10tx/s. Indeed, we can
see that the number of transactions per block increases from 25 to 150, approximately.
During the whole test, and especially after block 2000, we observe a high variability in the
number of transactions per block, roughly spanning from 100 to 250 transactions. This is due to
the non-uniform distribution of v4 and v6 transactions in the input file: the proportion of v4 and
v6 transactions is not constant for the entire file. Since the node processed transactions at a fixed
speed, regardless if they were v4 or v6, in a given period of time a we may not inject a constant
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number of v4 or v6 transactions. We can also notice this in the reduction of v4 transactions when
the number of v6 increases, and viceversa.
The maximum number of transactions per block revolves around 400, so we can estimate
IPchain’s throughput to be approximately 10 transactions per second, in the same order of mag-
nitude of Bitcoin. If we consider that average of number of BGP updates is between 10-15 per
second [79], and that our system targets a subset of those, we can conclude that IPchain presents
sufficient throughput for this application.
Blocktime
In order to verify the correct operation of the prototype, figure 3.9 also presents the time between
each consecutive block in the right y axis. We can see that in nearly all cases it remains in the
configured interval of 40 seconds, since we automatically trigger the block creation just after 40s
from the timestamp of the last block. In some cases, due to data processing delays it reaches 41s.
Bootstrap test
With the aim of quantifying IPchain’s cost in terms of time and compute resources, we performed
a bootstrap test, i.e. adding a new node to the network and measure: (i) time to validate all the
chain, and (ii) total chain storage. We must note that the time to download the blocks is negligible
compared to the validation time. We used a VM with two associated virtual CPUs (Intel Xeon
Platinum @ 3 GHz) and 4 GB RAM. It took 3.5 hours to verify the chain, that contained 350k
prefixes and required 2.5 GB of storage. This last metric lets us conclude that the chain can scale















































































Figure 3.9: Number of transactions in each block and block time. We can see the consequence of the non-uniform distribution of v4 and
v6 transactions especially after block 2000.
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3.7.2 Cryptography Metrics
Block time depending on BLS threshold
In this test we aim to calculate the minimum block time depending on the BLS threshold setup,
which in turn determines the chain throughput. We define the minimum block time as the time it
takes to generate the BLS shares, send them to the network, recover the group signature, calculate
the random number and create an empty block. Figure 3.10 presents the average of this time for
100 blocks for different threshold values. We set up 10 nodes in a cloud provider, each in a different
region of the world, and VMs with two virtual CPUs, Intel Xeon @ 2.5 GHz, 4GB RAM. The
nodes exchanged BLS shares, with 10 blockchain addresses for each (100 participants in the BLS
in total). As we can see, the minimum block time revolves around 6.15 seconds regardless of the
Threshold setup. Two main reasons explain this phenomenon: (i) the operation that joins the BLS
shares is not computationally intensive, and (ii) the share size is too small (each share weights
approximately 60 bytes) to cause an increase in the communication delay, i.e. the delay does not
increase significantly if we send 80 shares instead of 20 across the network. These results suggest
that the BLS Threshold does note have a noticeable impact on performance.


























Figure 3.10: Minimum block time depending on BLS Threshold setup.
DKG keys renewal time
Finally, we measured how long it took to perform a key refresh depending on the number of nodes.
We used the same cloud nodes than in the previous experiment. Figure 3.11 presents a linear
interpolation of data from three experiments. We can see that the delay grows linearly with the
number of nodes, basically because in this process: (i) each node has to send a message to the rest,
and (ii) the crytographic function to generate the group key is more costly than the one that joins
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the BLS shares.





























Figure 3.11: Delay to create private keys.
3.7.3 Long-term Storage Estimation
We performed a storage estimation in order to evaluate IPchain’s long-term feasibility. We es-
timated separately the number of IP prefix allocations and AS-to-prefix bindings, and made the
following assumptions. For the prefix allocation, transactions of 500 bytes, an initial load of the
current 600k prefixes in the BGP RIB table, plus re-allocating all BGP prefixes each year, and a
growth in new prefixes exponentially adjusted to the BGP RIB table growth [96]. Regarding the
bindings of AS numbers to prefixes, we assumed one AS-to-prefix binding for each block in all the
/24 IPv4 address space, each transaction weights around 400 bytes, and an update rate similar to
the BGP churn [97], increasing linearly each year.
Figure 3.12 presents the estimation for both AS numbers and IP prefixes, their sum, and a
comparison with Bitcoin, assuming it starts in 2019, keeps the 0.5 MB block size, the rate of 1
block each 10 min, and all blocks are full. We can see that prefixes account for a reduced part of
the transactions when compared to AS bindings; this is due to the continuous increase in the churn
and the number of bindings. Nevertheless, in 20 years’ time the chain accounts for approximately
600 GB, a figure that is easily attainable by current storage systems. Finally, we can see that in
this 20-year interval, we stay below the requirements of Bitcoin, which supports our thesis that a
blockchain for IP addresses has moderate storage requirements in the long term.
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Figure 3.12: 20-year storage estimation for IPchain
3.8 Related Work
3.8.1 Blockchain Applications to Networking
We can find several proposals in the literature oriented towards providing network services or
applications on top of blockchains [31], such as the Internet of Things [98], BGP messages [99, 100],
Information Centric Networking [101], mesh networks [102], or distributed access control [103].
However, the largest body of work focuses on providing naming applications with similar functions
to the DNS: Namecoin [29], Blockstack [30], Ethereum Name System [104], etc.
3.8.2 IP Address Allocation in the Public Internet
To the best of our knowledge, IPchain is the first blockchain specifically tailored for the allocation
and delegation of IP addresses. The first reference that mentions storing Internet routing data in
a blockchain is [99], but without providing any potential design guidelines, consensus algorithm, or
implementation. The most closely related work has been published later [105], and advocates for
an automatic IP prefix distribution system on top of an Hyperledger private blockchain. However,
in our proposal we maintain the manual allocation of IANA and RIRs and we use a PoS consensus
algorithm instead of Hyperledger’s certificate-based system. Other similar works focus on embed-
ding BGP path announcements in the blockchain [106], or deploying an IP allocation system as a
smart contract in Ethereum [107], but neither of them focus on the benefits of PoS algorithms.
3.9 Summary of Outcomes
In this chapter we have introduced IPchain, a Proof of Stake blockchain to store the allocation
and delegation of IP addresses. We have discussed its benefits over existing systems, both in
the policy side and the technical side. On the policy side, we argue that the decentralization of
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blockchains can mitigate the centralization concerns of current systems, offering an alternative to
distribute trust among all its participants. With respect to the technical issues, we have considered
how a blockchain can ease management or offer auditability when compared to current solutions.
Moreover, we have emphasized the advantages of a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm for our
specific use case. Finally, we have evaluated the performance of our prototype storing Internet
Registry data, and demonstrated that it can achieve the requirements for real-world deployments
regarding throughput and long-term storage.




48 CHAPTER 4. PRIVATE NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
Group-Based Policy (GBP), or policy-based networking [108] is a declarative approach to defining
network behavior. Network administrators specify network endpoints, groups of endpoints and
their policies using a high level language, which is later translated to network configurations. GBP
is widely employed in the industry, for example in OpenStack’s Neutron network API [109]. It can
be used to define rules between servers and clients, create service chains, etc.
Until now, GBP has been conceived as a language for a single administrative domain. In this
chapter, we analyze if we can extend it to several administrative domains, preserving at the same
time their independence. For example, we want to make it possible for an administrator in company
B to allow a VPN connection from a user in company A by simply typing:
createPolicy from=userA to=VPNserverB action=allow
Typically, there are two solutions for this scenario: (i) manual, by means of issuing a digital
certificate and giving it to the users (so they use it later to authenticate the connection), or
(ii) leveraging structures based on PKI systems, namely cross-domain certification or bridge CA
certificates [110]. These structures allow the co-existence of several CAs and ensure mutual trust.
However, these approaches present some limitations that have hindered their deployment. First
of all, scalability: in scenarios with thousands or tens of thousands of users, the manual approach is
unfeasible, and cross-certificating N domains means -in the worst case- issuing ∼ N2/2 certificates
[110, 111]. Second, granularity: it is not possible to define different policies for different users
without issuing more certificates, further affecting scalability. Finally, management: PKIs are
cumbersome to manage, especially day-to-day operations like adding and removing users, revocation
(requires a CRL subsystem) or key rollover.
With these limitations in mind, in this chapter we propose using a blockchain to overcome
them. In such blockchain, each organization defines its users and resources, and specifies which
users -from other organizations- can access its resources. Upon an access request, routers query












Figure 4.1: Global architecture.
Thanks to blockchain’s particular properties, we can design an access control system that im-
proves on several of PKI’s limitations:
Increased scalability: When we establish a new relationship in a PKI, we have to cross-certificate
the new entity with the rest. In a blockchain, however, we can directly reference previous
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transactions/users. This reduces the number of required certificates (transactions in this
case).
Improved granularity and flexibility: Since we can associate each resource or user with a pri-
vate key, we can alter its state without affecting the rest. This includes both its validity and
other data, for example, we can assign different policies to different users.
Simpler management: The transactional nature of blockchain makes management simpler: the
aforementioned common operations (key rollover, revocation) can be encoded as new trans-
actions, instead of requiring a dedicated subsystem, like CRLs and manifests.
In this chapter we present an architecture to support this use case, which actually is a multi-
domain mapping system. Indeed, the blockchain is a mapping system shared by all the companies
in order to connect different overlay networks across an underlay, for example the Internet. We
describe a practical end-to-end implementation and evaluate its performance to demonstrate its
feasibility. Our results show that we can store thousands of access polices with modest storage,
and achieve linear update times on a permissioned blockchain.
4.2 Why Blockchain?
Our use case presents two particular characteristics: (i) its participants have limited trust in each
other, and (ii) they want to retain full control over the access policies. This is because in a multi-
enterprise scenario: (i) companies are not willing to leave access control to a third party, and (ii)
each company must be able to revoke any access policy at any moment in time, respectively.
These requirements match the characteristics of any blockchain. For the first demand, its
consensus algorithm ensures that no single entity controls the blockchain and avoids having to fully
trust its participants. The second requirement is covered by the fact that blockchain assets are
controlled by their associated private key owner, not by a centralized entity.
On the other hand, an approach like this is much more complex in a classical PKI because
it cannot fulfill the previous two requirements. The first one because the CA is the single point
of trust in the system, which forces all participants to trust it. Furthermore, it cannot meet the
second as a consequence of the centralized trust: the CA can unilaterally alter state by means of
certificate revocation.
As mentioned before, other PKI schemes could provide an equivalent functionality, such as
bridge CA certificates, but in this case there is still a single point of trust in the bridge CA
certificate, thus it is not significantly different from a conventional CA. Cross-domain certification
may prove useful, however, it presents scalability limitations because each new CA has to cross-
certify with all the existing ones.
In addition, a blockchain can also alleviate these scalability concerns: we can reduce the num-
ber of required certificates (transactions in this case) since a blockchain allows directly referencing
existing transactions, instead of re-certifying with the PKI CA. In turn, this simplifies the verifi-
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cation of the chain of authorizations, i.e. it is not necessary to go up the CA, then down to the
cross-certificated. Authorization emerges directly from the originating organization.
Finally, thanks to emerging private blockchain platforms we can provide a certain degree of
privacy for their users (as opposed to public blockchains like Ethereum) and improve some of their
performance metrics (section 4.3.2).
4.3 Architecture











Figure 4.2: Layered architecture.
Policy: An intent-driven interface allows administrators to specify users, resources and access
policies. These polices are rendered into blockchain transactions.
Blockchain: A blockchain stores all the information and ensures its integrity and accuracy.
Network: Routers access the blockchain via an API to determine if a particular user can access
a specific resource. If the user is authorized, they retrieve authentication information to
establish a security association and allow the connection.
The following sections provide details on each element.
4.3.1 Policy interface
Administrators use a simple CLI, based on GBP, to perform management operations, such as
creating/deleting users, groups of users, policies and resources, as well as querying the blockchain
for specific policies, users, etc. We have chosen GBP because it is widely adopted in the industry
[109] and its semantics align pretty well with our use case.
Specifically, we can accommodate our use case to the OpenStack syntax simply re-using some
of its commands. For example, consider that organization B wants to grant access to its internal
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Figure 4.3: Example scenario
database to Alice from the Human Resources department of an external organization A (figure
4.3). First, company A creates a member for Alice:
gbp member-create alice
Then, company B creates a group for company A’s user and adds Alice into it:
gbp group-create dbaccess --add:orga.alice
It also creates the internal database as a member:
gbp member-create internalDB
Finally, organization B creates the policy associated to its database and company A’s user,





The GBP syntax can be extended with more options, for example, adding a one week timeout
to Alice’s membership in the internalDB group:
gbp group-create dbaccess --add:orga.alice --timeout 1w
This custom logic can be easily implemented thanks to the ability of some blockchains to run
smart contracts.
52 CHAPTER 4. PRIVATE NETWORKS
4.3.2 Blockchain
In this section we discuss two major design decisions we took for our blockchain.
Participants: We believe that a private blockchain (only authorized members can access it) fits
better in this scenario than a public, mainly because its participants are not willing to make
their access policies public. Communicating access policies only to a group of companies is
sufficient for correct operation.
Consensus algorithm: We argue that a BFT protocol suits our use case, due to the following
reasons:
1. Security: classical BFT protocols such as XFT [112] or BFT-SMART [113] offer proven
security guarantees, as opposed to PoW or PoS algorithms, some of which lack a formal
security analysis or a mature implementation.
2. We can re-use the access control PKI of the private chain in the BFT protocol, since
they require some kind of node authentication.
3. Higher throughput: BFT algorithms typically reach consensus faster than PoW or PoS,
thus increasing the amount of transactions per second.
4. Immediate finality: in a BFT protocol, when a transaction has been added in the chain,
it will never be removed. On the contrary, a Bitcoin fork prevents immediate finality.
5. We can avoid well-known PoW/PoS drawbacks, e.g. high energy consumption or limited
throughput.
Finally, it should be noted that BFT-based chains suffer from scalability concerns, i.e., they
cannot scale to as many users as well-know PoW or PoS chains like Bitcoin (in the order of
millions). However, this is not our case: a chain with hundreds or even tenths of companies
would be perfectly functional.
4.3.3 Network
In order to perform the access control, we have chosen the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP,
RFC 6830 [90]). LISP is a request-response protocol that allows the communication of control and
data planes. In our scenario, routers can easily retrieve the blockchain access control policies from
the control plane with minimal modification of the base protocol. For this particular use case, LISP
is conceptually equivalent to OpenFlow [6]. Hence, we can use other protocols for this task, such
as the aforementioned OpenFlow or P4 Runtime [7].
In a nutshell, we store the access policies in the LISP control plane and update them through
the blockchain. LISP-enabled routers query the control plane to determine if a particular user
can access the requested resource. Users authenticate to the router by means of including their
signature in the LISP control plane messages (Map Request and Map Reply).
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4.3.4 Typical Workflow
Figure 4.4 presents an example of the typical workflow in this architecture, in which two companies
set up a secure connection from User A of company A to Resource B located in company B.
Blockchain
Company A User A
Company B Resource B A > B
LISP RouterUser A Resource B
(1) Setup
(7) Establish VPN
(3) Request A > B
(2) Assign key
(4) Verify A > B
(5) Reply A > B
(6) Reply A > B OK
LISP Control Plane
Figure 4.4: Typical architecture workflow.
1. At setup time, administrators from both companies store the required information in the
chain. Company A adds User A and its public key. Company B details its resource (Resource
B) and grants access to company A’s user (A > B). They use a similar CLI to the example
in section 4.3.1.
2. Company A assigns User A its credentials (public-private keypair), with the public key being
the one in the blockchain.
3. When User A wants to connect to Resource B, it sends a LISP control message to the LISP
control plane. The message is signed by User A.
4. The LISP Control Plane verifies the signature and checks the access policy against the block-
chain.
5. If they are correct, it sends a reply message to Company B’s LISP Router.
6. The LISP router sends a reply message with the cryptographic material for data plane en-
cryption, in order to establish a security association with User A. This message is encrypted
with User A’s public key.
7. The LISP router and User A start a secure connection, e.g. with LISP-CRYPTO (RFC 8061
[114]) or other VPN protocols (L3VPN or equivalent).
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4.4 Implementation
We have built an end-to-end prototype encompassing the three components of the aforementioned
architecture: GBP interface, Blockchain, and Network. It is available as open-source code [115].
4.4.1 GBP Command Line
We designed a CLI inspired on GBP commands that allows the creation, deletion, and retrieval of
users, groups of users, resources and access policies, highly similar to the examples in section 4.3.1.
For example create resource creates a new resource for the organization. Additional options in
the commands specify the IP address of the resource, the public key of a user, etc.
4.4.2 Blockchain
Our implementation heavily leverages the Hyperledger (HL) project, an open-source permissioned
blockchain implementation. Specifically, we have chosen its Fabric [116] framework because of
its maturity, flexibility and business-orientation. Moreover, thanks to Fabrics’s channels, we can
establish private communications among sub-sets of companies if privacy is a strong concern.
In this section we detail the different configuration parameters and rules for our prototype in
the HL Fabric framework.
Assets
We defined the following elements in the chain:
Users: Source endpoints, identified by public key K+ and including other information: originating
organization, LISP Endpoint Identifier (EID), name and department. The LISP EID is their
overlay IP address inside the the corresponding enterprise network.
Departments: A group of users within an organization, identified by department name and their
belonging organization. They identify groups of users in order to create simultaneously poli-
cies for several users.
Resources: Destination endpoints, identified by a LISP EID and the belonging organization.
Again, the LISP EID is the overlay network IP address in the enterprise network.
Policies: Access control lists that grant access either from a source endpoint (user) or from a
group of users (department) to a destination endpoint (resource). They are identified by a
composite key (source-destination). Typically, the source endpoint is a user or department
of another organization and the destination is a resource of the issuing organization. Policies




Each organization is identified by a Membership Service Provider (MSP). MSP is the Hyperledger
component that generates and manages the digital certificates to identify the participants in the
blockchain.
Chaincode
We imposed as a global constraint that only the organization that creates an asset can alter its
state (e.g. delete, associate with another asset, etc). We enforce this by binding all assets to their
respective MSP, and rejecting any modification from a non-owner MSP.
On the other hand, any organization within the same HL channel can query information about
any asset of any organization in the chain.
Endorsement policy
In our implementation, all members have to endorse any transaction. However, other schemes are
possible thanks to Fabric’s flexibility. Depending on the level of trust among the participating
organizations and the particular use case, we can adjust the minimum number of endorsements.
Some examples are: half + 1 of the members, 2f + 1 valid signatures out of n endorsers (assuming
f faulty endorsers and n > 3f), or AND/OR syntax (member A OR members (B,C,D)), etc.
Ordering Service
We leveraged the SOLO ordering service (i.e. a centralized orderer), so we could ease development.
However, in a production setup Apache Kafka could be a good fit, because it can tolerate several
faulty or disconnected nodes.
In scenarios with low trust among participants, Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) ordering ser-
vices can be easily plugged thanks to Fabric’s modular design. However, we believe that a Crash
Fault Tolerant (CFT) algorithm is enough for this use case since a double-spend does not make sense
here1. In addition, HL’s endorse-order-validate transaction lifecycle offers a variety of mechanisms
to prevent or detect misbehavior.
4.4.3 OpenOverlayRouter Software Router
In order to effectively perform access control, we took advantage of an open-source LISP imple-
mentation, Open Overlay Router (OOR [89]). We made a slight modification to its Tunnel Router
mode: when it receives a Map Request packet, it queries Hyperledger with the source and destina-
tion endpoints, via an ad-hoc API. Hyperledger checks if the pair of (source, destination) is allowed
to establish a connection and notifies OOR. If they can connect, OOR then responds to the source
with a Map Reply message, otherwise takes no action. This way, unauthorized users do not receive
1Note that in a CFT environment some attacks, such as censoring a transaction, may become feasible.
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a Map Reply and do not know where to connect. Of course, a production setup requires additional
security mechanisms, as discussed in section 4.3.3.
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
4.5.1 Scenario
We set up an experimental scenario on a PC running Ubuntu 16.06 and a quad-core Intel i5 CPU
650 @ 3.20GHz. Table 4.1 summarizes HL parameters during the experiment. Thanks to the
Docker containerization of HL, we could emulate 4 organizations, each with 2 peers, all in the same
PC. We artificially generated around 1 million policies and users to evaluate the read latency, and
added at most 15 endorsers to estimate the write latency.
Number of organizations 4
Typical key + value size 32 bytes
Number of channels 1
State database LevelDB key-value store
Endorsement Policy AND(Org1,Org2,Org3,Org4)
Ordering Service SOLO
Block timeout 100 ms
Table 4.1: Experimental Setup
4.5.2 Results
We carried out several experiments on our implementation to characterize its performance and have
an understanding of its scalability.
Read latency
Figure 4.5 presents the average query time for different number of elements in the chain. In this
case the state DB was CouchDB (HL allows using both LevelDB and Couch DB as state DB,
with similar performance). We can see that it revolves around 40 ms regardless of the number
of elements, because Couch DB is a key-value store (these type of databases present constant
query latency). It should be noted that the query performs exact matches of pairs of source and
destination IP addresses, and that future work should also support longest-prefix matching.
Write latency
Figure 4.6 plots the time required to add a new user depending on the number of endorsers in the
network. As we can see, the latency grows linearly with the number of endorsers, because each new
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Figure 4.5: Hyperledger CouchDB query latency.




























Figure 4.6: Latency to add a new user for different number of endorsers.
endorser is an additional signature that the issuer has to verify (the current HL implementation
makes this verification sequentially). This result is in line with in a recent benchmark of the HL
platform [117].
Chain size
We were also interested in the chain size, i.e. required storage. Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 show the total
chain size depending on the number of transactions and endorsers, respectively. As expected, in
both cases the size grows linearly with the number of transactions or endorsers (in the latter case
because more endorsers mean more signatures per transaction). We can see that these situations
require very modest storage. Thus, we can safely assume that scenarios with a considerable amount
of participants (e.g. 1k endorsers would demand ∼25 GB) or a long transaction history (1M
transactions take up ∼10 GB) can be easily supported.
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Figure 4.7: Chain size vs. number of transactions, in a setup with four endorsers.
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Figure 4.8: Chain size depending on the number of required endorsers (5k transactions in the
chain).
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Network latency
Figure 4.9 presents the query time CDF of a LISP control plane node (Map Server) storing 1k, 10k
or 100k pairs of source, destination pairs. In other words, given a source node, how long does it
take to find the authorized destination node(s). Since this test was performed in a local network,
we consider the communication delay negligible.
We can see that the majority of the queries are completed in less than 0.35 ms, roughly two
orders of magnitude below the HL database delay. This is mainly due to two reasons: (i) the
Map Server is implemented in C (whereas the queries in figure 4.5 go through HL’s Node.js API,
CouchDB and back), and (ii) data is stored in a Patricia Trie, a tree optimized for prefix queries. In
addition, the delay is independent of the number of elements thanks again to the Patricia Trie: the
delay depends on the length of the elements (source endpoints, IP addresses in our implementation),
not the number.
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Figure 4.9: CDF for LISP Map Server query delay for 1k, 10k or 100k pairs of source, destination
nodes.
4.5.3 Discussion
The previous results demonstrate that the proposed system can easily scale to meet the demands
of a federation of several organizations. Table 4.2 outlines several metrics and their requirements
in terms of scalability.
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On one hand, both the read and network latencies can support high query rates. The read
latency presents a constant response time regardless of the number of elements in the chain (in
case of exact matches), and the network server storing the access policies, linear with the length of
identifiers.
On the other hand, the write latency can suffer if we have a large amount organizations in the
same blockchain. However, it is not as critical as the read latency because we can tolerate a delay
up to several seconds when adding a user.
Finally, the chain size obviously depends linearly on the number of transactions, but also on the
number of endorsers. This last relationship puts an additional strain on scalability, because it affects
both chain size and write latency. There is a trade-off here between a small number of endorsers
(small write latency and chain size, but more centralized trust in a narrow set of participants), and
a large number of them (higher write latency and size but more distributed trust). Thus, special
consideration should be put in the number of endorsers and the endorsement policy to achieve an
equilibrium between a tolerable write latency and the expected number of endorsements.





linear w.r.t. number of
transactions and endorsers
Network latency
linear w.r.t. identifier size
+ propagation delay
Table 4.2: Scalability Analysis
4.6 Related Work
The most closely related work is [103], which implements Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
policies over the Bitcoin blockchain. It presents three main differences with our work: (i) it focuses
on access control for individual users, unlike our organization-based approach, (ii) it allows trans-
ferring access control rights between users, and (iii) does not consider using a private chain or a
different consensus algorithm. Hadi [118] proposes a data distribution system in which the block-
chain is the data persistence layer, but is also user-centric and more oriented towards data storage
and messaging services rather than networking. Similarly, we can find research on blockchain as
an access control technology for distributed cloud storage [119, 120].
In addition, there is also a growing body of work on blockchain-based access control both for
IoT: [121] leverages a blockchain to store access permissions for IoT devices with a strong emphasis
on key management and distribution. [122] also provides authentication, authorization and auditing
for IoT but separates them in four independent blockchains, and is generic enough to support a
4.7. SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES 61
wide range of access control models typical of IoT, while our proposal is restricted to a specific
language, GBP.
Finally, [123] presents an interesting perspective on revocation management in distributed access
control with blockchains that aligns well with our ideas.
4.7 Summary of Outcomes
In this chapter we have presented a multi-domain mapping system based on an permissioned
blockchain. We have implemented and evaluated a prototype to support the use case of access
control in cross-domain communications, specifically different enterprise networks that do not trust
each other. In order to reduce the burden on network administrators, the front-end builds on
GBP, a well-known intent-driven language. Such blockchain distributes network polices, and helps
overcome drawbacks of classical solutions while at the same time maintains the independence of
each organization. The experimental evaluation shows that this design can easily scale to -at least-
tenths of organizations with modest storage requirements.
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Part II
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a design to secure the underlay part of overlay networks based on the
WireGuard VPN protocol as a data plane, and LISP as a control plane. WireGuard (WG [28]) is a
recent VPN protocol that has managed to disrupt the mature field of VPNs [124–127]. One of the
main reasons behind WireGuard’s success is that it trades off flexibility for simplicity. As opposed
to traditional VPNs that support a large set of cipher suites and that negotiate its capabilities
before establishing the secure connection, WireGuard only supports one cipher suite, specifically
-at the time of this writing- ChaCha20 and Poly1305 (RFC 8439 [128]). This greatly simplifies the
architecture as well as the code, providing also important performance advantages.
In short, in WireGuard users only have to exchange the public keys of the endpoints and the
IP address of one of them to start exchanging data. In fact, the setup is very similar to that of
SSH. The underlying implementation takes care of the cryptography aspects of a typical VPN: key
derivation, re-keying timers, anti-replay protection, etc. In addition, WireGuard:
 Supports mobility
 Sends keepalives to maintain NAT holes open
 Has a reduced codebase to ease auditing
 Is implemented in the Linux kernel, which yields high performance
Thanks to these outstanding features, WireGuard is gaining popularity and it is becoming the
de facto VPN standard for certain Internet communities. However, WireGuard lacks some critical
features to enter Internet professional scenarios, such as ISPs or Enterprise networks. On the other
side, end users that would like to add confidentiality to their connections usually have to rely on
deploying IPsec in the underlay, with its associated complexity.
One of the main limitations is that WireGuard lacks a control plane. Hence, users have to
manually setup the public keys and IP addresses in all of their endpoints, i.e. when we add a new
device to the network we have configure its public key in all the existing devices. This process is
time-consuming and error-prone.
Taking this into account, in this chapter we aim to design, prototype and evaluate a control
plane for WireGuard. Specifically, we focus on three key points:
1. Automate the distribution of WireGuard keys without relying on PKI-based schemes or DNS-
based schemes (e.g. IETF DANE [129, 130]). These systems require complex configuration
or additional infrastructure like a DNS server. On the other hand, although there exist
commercial systems that can offer equivalent functionality, such as Dynamic Multipoint VPN
[131], or modern SD-WAN systems [132], their details are not public.
2. Reduce as much as possible the number of public keys stored in the endpoints, in order to
reduce communication overhead and avoid sharing unnecessary cryptographic information.
Also, we want to be as fast as possible when creating new tunnels.
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3. Understand and pinpoint other potential limitations of the WireGuard protocol to be con-
sidered for Enterprise or ISP scenarios.
The proposed control plane works as follows: we store the public keys of all peers in a central
server, that sends them to the WireGuard peers upon request (figure 5.1). This way, users only have
to setup a secure connection between the peer and the central server on bootstrap (0); new peers
store their public key and endpoint IP address in the server (1). Afterwards, peers retrieve any
information from the central server (2) and can establish WireGuard tunnels with this information
(3). Note that the devices in figure 5.1 can be either standalone devices (for example, when securing
the network of an end user), or routers connecting different branches of an enterprise network (which
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Figure 5.1: Global design. Dashed lines represent data plane traffic flow, solid lines control plane
traffic.
We must remark that the idea of storing public keys in a centralized server is not new, but
rather a well-know topic (section 5.7.1). On the contrary, the contributions of this chapter lie on
the practical implementation side, specifically:
1. The design caveats of a centralized key distribution control plane
2. The selection of a protocol to reduce the query latency when requesting a public key
3. Implementation details
4. Performance evaluation
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first control plane for WireGuard-based VPNs.
5.2 Background: WireGuard
From a network architecture perspective, WireGuard adds two additional headers to a standard
IP datagram (figure 5.2). First, an outer IP header, that contains the peer IP address. This
header supports mobility; its IP address can change arbitrarily as the peer roams across different
networks (e.g WiFi, LTE). Afterwards, there is a UDP header plus a custom header that contains
the message type, cryptography information, and the encrypted payload. Inside the payload we
find the inner IP header, the one used by applications. This header is used on the receiving end to
perform access control, i.e. we can specify a list of allowed IP prefixes.
Outer IP header UDP header
Crypto 






Figure 5.2: WireGuard header structure
The key advantage of this architecture is that the three headers are independent: we can modify
any of them without impacting the others. For example, in case that a peer changes its IP address
due to a mobility event, the crypto header and the encrypted data will be successfully decrypted
in the destination. In summary, each header performs a different task:
 Outer IP header: mobility, can change freely
 Crypto header: authentication, confidentiality
 Inner IP header: access control
The key element of WireGuard’s operation is the cryptokey routing table, that binds source
IP addresses (usually IP addresses in the private range) to peer public keys (table 5.1). In other
words, the source IP is used to determine the encryption key and the receiving peer. Additionally, it
stores the Internet IP address of the peer, that is used in the outer IP header. Figure 5.3 presents
the packet flow of an outgoing WireGuard packet. First, users configure the cryptokey routing
table with the peers and adjust the Linux routing table to forward this packets to the WireGuard
interface (2). This way, new packets destined to the peers (1) are forwarded to the WireGuard
interface (2, 3). The interface does a reverse IP lookup (i.e. source address) on the cryptokey
routing table to find the peer’s key and Internet endpoint. In figure 5.3, the selected key is Peer
B’s. Using this data, it encrypts, encapsulates and sends the packet to the physical interface (4).
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Allowed Source IP Public key Internet Endpoint
10.10.0.0/16, 10.11.0.0/16 Peer A key 80.80.80.80
172.16.1.0/24, 172.16.2.2/32 Peer B key 100.128.128.128
192.168.4.0/24 Peer C key 40.0.0.0
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WireGuard Cryptokey Routing Table
Allowed Src. IP Public key Internet Endpoint
10.10.0.0/16 Peer A key 80.80.80.80











Figure 5.3: WireGuard packet transmission
Upon reception, the previous process is reversed. First packets are decrypted. WireGuard uses
a local identifier (equivalently to IPsec) to match incoming packets to the their security association.
If decryption is successful, the WireGuard interface performs access control. Specifically, it verifies
that the source IP address of the packets is in the list of IP prefixes of the associated public key.
This determines if packets are accepted or dropped. Finally, they are forwarded back to the kernel
routing table, and in turn to the corresponding application socket.
We must remark that other common VPN protocols, like IPsec, TLS or OpenVPN do not
support mobility out of the box like WireGuard (section 5.7.2).
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5.3 Architecture
5.3.1 Threat Model
For this specific use case, either for end users or enterprise networks, we assume we can trust both
the endpoints and the centralized server, i.e. we consider legitimate any control plane message they
send. On the other hand, the underlying network is not trustworthy.
In order to protect the signaling between clients and server, we establish a WireGuard tunnel
between them (section 5.3.3). The keys for these tunnels are part of the configuration stage and
are exchanged out of band. This way client and server have a way to authenticate each other.
In addition, the centralized server stores only the endpoint location (Internet IP address), and its
corresponding public key. These assumptions raise a set of security concerns in both the centralized
server and the endpoints that we discuss below.
Central server
Single point of failure: using a centralized server creates a single point of failure, especially
vulnerable to DDoS attacks. We can mitigate this risk with: (i) replicating the central
server, and (ii) since the centralized server uses WireGuard tunnels, they include an anti-
DDoS mechanism, detailed in section 5.3 of [28]. This mechanism is based on a cookie from
the server that the client has to re-send when establishing a connection.
Leak of peer locations and/or public keys: in this situation, although an attacker can initi-
ate connections with the rest of the peers, it won’t be able to finalize the handshake because
the peers won’t receive the attacker’s public key from the central server (section 5.3.3). More-
over, in case of compromise it is possible to remove the affected key from the central server
so the rest of the peers cannot establish communication.
Leak of the private key of the central server: this is the worst scenario, since an attacker
can impersonate the central server and mount a monkey-in-the-middle-attack. The secrecy
of the private key depends on the OS security precautions.
Endpoints
Leak of peer locations and/or public keys: similarly to the central server, this leak does not
allow an attacker to connect to any peer, because it will not be able to successfully authen-
ticate in the central server. It may be able to take advantage of peers that that previously
stored its public key in their cache, though.
Leak of the private key of the peer: on the contrary, here the attacker will be able to imper-
sonate the peer when connecting to the central server, retrieve connection data and success-
fully establish connections to the rest of endpoints. Likewise, it is possible remove this key
from the central server to prevent future connections.
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5.3.2 Discussion
The key architecture decision we took was the state distribution model: send all the keys to all
peers (push model) versus each peer retrieving only the keys it needed (pull model).
We chose the pull approach for two reasons. First, security, because we avoid sharing all the
public keys with all the peers. Second, minimizing the amount of state in the data plane. Since
we only download the keys we need, the WireGuard cryptokey routing table is less crowded. In
turn, this reduces control plane signaling overhead and increases scalability. We must remark that
we are assuming that the traffic pattern among the peers is not full mesh, i.e., peers do not need
all the existing keys, but just a bunch of them. On the other hand, the main drawback of a pull
architecture is an increased connection establishment time. In order to minimize this delay, we
chose an UDP-based protocol to retrieve the keys. Section 5.5.1 quantifies this delay.
5.3.3 Architecture Description
In a nutshell, our architecture lays two elements on top of a WireGuard deployment (figure 5.1).
First, a centralized database that contains, for each WireGuard peer, its associated public key and
endpoint IP address. Second, a secure control channel between the centralized database and the
WireGuard peers, that we use to retrieve the aforementioned WireGuard configuration (solid lines).
The central database indexes peers by their inner IP address, i.e. the one used by applications and
encrypted by WireGuard.
The centralized database distributes the configuration data on demand: when a peer does not
have the public key for a particular destination IP (i.e. we don’t have an entry in the WG crypto
table), we request the public key and endpoint IP via the control channel, and configure WG
appropriately (step (2) in figure 5.1 in order to communicate with Device 2). The central server
answers this request but also pushes Device 1 public key and Endpoint IP to Device 2. This is
due to the fact that, in order to successfully establish a new WireGuard tunnel, both peers need
to have each others’ public key. In other words, we use a pull-and-push approach: the node that
initiates a connection pulls the key, while we push the key to the receiving node. Finally, once both
peers have each other’s data, they can establish the WireGuard tunnel (3, dashed line).
Taking this into account, we defined the following messages for the control channel to interact
with the database: (i) Store a peer public key + endpoint IP, (ii) Request a peer public key, and
(iii) Send a public key to a peer.
5.4 Implementation
In order to implement the protocol for the control channel, we leveraged the control plane part of
the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP, RFC 6833 [133]). LISP is a mature and standardized
protocol, designed to dynamically create network overlays. This makes it an excellent candidate for
this application, because LISP’s control messages present nearly a 1:1 match to our requirements
(table 5.2). Moreover, the LISP architecture includes the Mapping System, a centralized server that
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stores pairs of overlay to underlay IP addresses. However, it is possible to adapt other SDN south-
bound protocols such as P4runtime [7] or OpenFlow [6] for this use case, or even use HTTP-based
interfaces, like REST (RFC 7231 [134]), WebSocket (RFC 6455 [135]) or gRPC [136]. However, we
chose to use LISP due to performance concerns: since LISP runs on UDP, it offers lower latency
when compared to TCP and HTTP-based protocols. We consider the control plane latency relevant
for our use case since it is in the critical path to establish new connections (section 5.5.2 compares
such delay with gRPC). On the other hand, we must remark that the aforementioned interfaces
offer more extensibility than LISP.
Design message LISP message
Store key Map Register
Request key Map Request
Send key Map Notify
Table 5.2: Equivalence of section 5.3.3 messages and LISP messages
Our prototype is based on an open-source LISP implementation, Open Overlay Router (OOR,
[137]). OOR is implemented in C and works in Linux user space, which makes it easy to implement
new features [89]. In a nutshell, we modified OOR to:
1. Detect flows that do not have an active WireGuard tunnel configuration.
2. Request its associated public key with the aforementioned control plane messages.
3. Configure accordingly the WireGuard interface.
5.4.1 Endpoints
Figure 5.4 presents a diagram of our implementation. First, we configure a WireGuard interface
to tunnel all control plane packets to the central server (i.e. server endpoint IP and pubic key).
We use a statically defined IP prefix to identify and route such requests through this interface.
We also create a TUN interface and add a default route in the kernel routing table pointing to it.
The purpose of the TUN interface is allowing OOR to connect, capture packets and examine their
destination IP address. If the IP address is not in its local database, OOR will send a LISP Map
Request to the central server to retrieve the key. We must remark that the OOR database is a copy
of the WireGuard Cryptokey Routing table. Once it receives this information, OOR configures the
new peer in a second WireGuard interface that handles only data plane traffic. Note here that the
prototype uses two WireGuard interfaces, one for data plane traffic, and another for control plane
traffic.
Then, OOR adds a more specific route for this new prefix in the kernel routing table. This route
points to the WireGuard Data interface. New traffic for this prefix will bypass the TUN interface
and go directly to the WireGuard Data interface. This is especially relevant since it avoids copying
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Figure 5.4: Simplified prototype operation diagram. Solid lines represent data plane traffic flow,
dashed lines control plane traffic.
In case a peer does not want to tunnel all its traffic through the dynamically-created WireGuard
tunnels (split tunneling), it can bypass them by adding more specific routes in the kernel routing
table pointing to an alternative destination.
5.4.2 Central Server
We implemented the aforementioned centralized server as a LISP Mapping System, more specifically
a single Map Server. In other words, all peers send their requests to the same Map Server. This
Map Server is running a modified version of the OOR Map Server, in which incoming Map Requests
trigger a Map Notify to the destination WireGuard peer. This way, the destination peer receives
the sender key and the tunnel can be established. In order to carry the peer public key in the LISP
messages, we leveraged the LISP Canonical Address Format, LCAF (RFC 8060 [138]), an extension
of such protocol that allows adding extra data in the Map Request / Map Reply messages (LCAF
11 - security key).
Finally, in case a peer wants to update its public key, we can easily update this information
with a LISP Map Register message.
5.5 Evaluation
We evaluated different metrics of our implementation in order to quantify the overhead of adding
security (i.e. the WireGuard cryptography), as well as the delay of the pull architecture. Since
OOR also implements the LISP data plane, i.e. it can create unencrypted network overlays, we
took OOR’s performance (not modified) as a baseline. We carried out all tests in a lab setup with 1
Gb Ethernet interfaces, and we considered the network delay negligible. The servers were running
Linux Ubuntu 16.04 on an Intel Xeon E5-2650 v4 @ 2.20 GHz.
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5.5.1 End-to-end Delay
Figure 5.5 presents the CDF of the delay to establish a tunnel, i.e the time since we send a
probe packet until we receive the first response. The setup consisted of two instances of our
implementation in the same LAN, directly connected with each other and also to the central
server. We setup a data rate of 10000 pings/s to have an adequate time resolution. The measured
time includes all the control plane signaling and the establishment of the WireGuard tunnels (for
OOR+WG) or the LISP tunnels (for OOR). We repeated this experiment 100 times. We can see
that WireGuard adds an extra delay of approximately 1 ms due to the cryptography. We consider
this delay acceptable, taking into account that we are comparing an unencrypted connection (OOR),
and an encrypted one (OOR+WG). We must remark that OOR packets go through user space,
while in OOR+WG they stay in kernel space. The former adds an extra delay because data
packets are copied from kernel to user space and vice-versa (figure 5.6 shows a diagram of how



















Figure 5.5: Tunnel Establishment end-to-end delay CDF
5.5.2 Control Channel Performance
We evaluated the performance of our control plane implementation and compared it to: (i) OOR
with LISP data plane, and (ii) a prototype that uses gRPC instead of LISP to retrieve the public
key. This prototype is based on a C version of gRPC [139] , and uses a WireGuard secure tunnel to
communicate with the central server, like the OOR+WG prototype. Figure 5.7 presents the CDF
of the end-to-end delay to add data for a new endpoint, or connection establishment time. We
measured the time it takes to retrieve the public key for a new endpoint from the central server.

















Figure 5.6: Out of the box OOR implementation diagram. Solid lines represent data plane traffic
flow, dashed lines control plane traffic. As opposed to the OOR + WG implementation in figure
5.4, data plane traffic is copied between kernel and userspace, adding overhead.
WireGuard takes approximately 1.5 ms more than OOR to complete this operation. This is due to
the fact that we are retrieving more information (WireGuard needs the public key, apart from he
endpoint IP address) and the overhead of configuring the WireGuard interface (as opposed to OOR,
in which we can start sending packets directly). Nevertheless, since the WireGuard public keys are
32 bytes, the performance penalty of downloading this extra information is negligible compared to
typical Internet latency [140]. On the other hand, the gRPC prototype presents a delay double to
OOR+WG, due to the overhead of its HTTP/2 transport.
5.5.3 Central Server Scalability
We also evaluated the scalability of the centralized server. Figure 5.8 presents the delay to answer
a request for endpoint data for both OOR and OOR with WireGuard, depending on the number of
elements in the central server. Specifically, we measured the processing delay of the central server,
i.e. the time since it receives a data request until it generates the corresponding response. We
repeated this experiment 50 times for each number of elements in the server. We can appreciate
that the delay does not depend on the number of elements because the server implementation uses
a Patricia Trie [141]. In other words, the maximum number of peers a single server can handle will
be limited by its CPU, not the database size. Additionally, this experiment quantifies the overhead
of adding a public key in the central server database. We can see that it increases the delay on
average 40 µs. Again, this modest increase is due to the aforementioned extra 32 bytes.














































Figure 5.8: Central server response delay
5.5.4 Handover Delay
Regarding mobility events, figure 5.9 presents the handover delay for OOR and OOR+WireGuard.
We modified the setup of section 5.5.1 by connecting one of the two peers via WiFi through two
possible access points (figure 5.10), and we triggered handovers by manually changing the access
point of this peer. We ran a ping of 10 requests/ms between the two machines and measured the
amount time without ICMP replies. We repeated this experiment 20 times. This test shows that
WireGuard presents a handover delay nearly one order of magnitude less than OOR. This is due
to the fact that the WireGuard handover: (i) operates in kernel space, and (ii) it does not require
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Figure 5.9: Handover delay






Figure 5.10: Handover evaluation setup
From an architecture point of view, we observe that adding a security association simplifies
mobility, because we can learn new endpoints through the data plane with virtually no signaling.
In addition, if the endpoint IP address is spoofed, the payload is protected by the WG crypto
header. On the other hand, this technique does not cover corner cases such as double jump. This
is in line with the design philosophy of WireGuard, that sacrifices flexibility for simplicity.
5.5.5 Data Plane Performance
Finally, we measured the data plane throughput. Figure 5.11 presents the input and output rate
for our OOR+WireGuard implementation, IPsec, and out-of-the box OOR. In the same setup as
in section 5.5.1, we configured a tunnel between the two servers, and we used the nuttcp utility to
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determine real throughput between them for several input rates, and for each protocol. We sent
UDP packets, and adjusted the lengths of the send/receive buffers taking into account the size of
the different headers of each protocol, in order to fill in the packets but avoid L3 fragmentation.
We configured IPsec in tunnel mode with the same encryption algorithm as WireGuard (ChaCha20
and Poly1305). We can see that both OOR+WG and IPsec offer similar performance, and start to
degrade gracefully around 900 Mbps. On the other hand, the OOR version that uses the LISP data
























Figure 5.11: Throughput comparison
5.6 Lessons Learned
During the implementation and evaluation of our prototype, we found a few shortcomings in Wire-
Guard. Some are especially relevant for enterprise (Virtual Networking) and ISP (multi-homing)
scenarios. In this section we comment on them and outline possible approaches. Some of them can
be addressed with our proposed control plane, others require modifying the WireGuard data plane.
5.6.1 Virtual Networking
It is common to support several instances of the same addressing space, especially in enterprise
environments. The most common solution is adding an extra field in the headers that acts as
identifier, e.g. VXLAN Network Identifier [22]. Since WireGuard packets do not include a Virtual
Network Identifier, it is not possible to make this distinction. However, it can be accomplished by
adding this field to the WireGuard header, or adding a VXLAN header before sending packets to
the WireGuard interface, for instance. We believe this is a relevant feature that could be considered
among the WireGuard community.
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5.6.2 Multi-homing
Our implementation cannot send encrypted traffic from multiple Internet endpoints at the same
time (i.e. multi-homing). The main reason is that WireGuard only supports a single endpoint IP
at any moment in time. If the endpoint IP changes it is interpreted as a mobility event, not traffic
coming from different sources. A possible solution consists in leveraging the control plane channel
to advertise the set of possible Internet endpoints to both peers. However, this means that the
WireGuard data plane cannot update the Internet endpoint of a peer when it receives a packet
with a different IP, thus making mobility more complex. This feature is especially interesting in
the context of increased mobile device usage, e.g. WiFi and LTE interfaces in a smartphone, or
ISPs that offer VPN solutions.
5.6.3 Mobility Double Jump
In case two peers change their Internet endpoint at the same time, it is not possible to re-establish
connection only with data plane mechanisms. However, thanks to our control plane we can account
for this situation. When a peer detects it has not received packets after some time, it sends a new
key request to the control plane. Since the other peer will have updated its new endpoint in the
control plane, the former peer will receive the new endpoint IP and communication will resume.
5.7 Related Work
5.7.1 Key Distribution
The problem of storing public key data in a centralized server, and distributing it to establish secure
tunnels is a well-know topic and has been previously explored, such as in Kerberos [142], or the
IETF DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE [129, 130]), that makes it possible to
add different types of public keys in DNS records like IPsec keys (RFC 4322 [143]). Furthermore,
there is extensive research in dynamic VPN configuration and management [144]. More recently,
SDN-inspired solutions propose to configure IPsec endpoints in a centralized fashion [145], as well
as the widespread usage of Software-Defined WANs that automatically setup IPsec tunnels [132].
The most closely related work is a theoretical analysis to configure WireGuard with OpenFlow
extensions [146]. However, it does not provide an implementation or performance data, rather
focusing on the design of control plane messages.
5.7.2 Secure Data Planes
Table 5.3 compares several features of WireGuard and two of the most popular L3 VPN proto-
cols: IPsec [147] and OpenVPN [148], along with the overhead of their headers. We can see that
WireGuard supports both NAT traversal and mobility, with the same overhead of OpenVPN with
DTLS. OpenVPN does not support mobility but can deal with NAT with additional configuration
[149]. Finally, IPsec does not offer NAT traversal nor mobility but incurs in a smaller overhead.
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However, we must note that IPsec can handle both NAT traversal and mobility with additional
extensions: IPsec over UDP, and the MOBIKE extension (RFC 4555 [150]), respectively.
Protocol NAT-trav. Mobility Overhead (Bytes)







Table 5.3: Comparison of common data plane encryption protocols
Regarding other data plane encapsulations, such as VXLAN (RFC 7348 [22]), VXLAN-GPE
[151], GENEVE [152] or ILA [153], it is interesting to remark that they do not usually consider
security or mobility (with the notable exception of ILA mobility), as opposed to the protocols in
table 5.3.
5.8 Summary of Outcomes
In this chapter we have presented a control plane for nodes using the WireGuard VPN protocol.
Such control plane stores the WireGuard public keys in a centralized server and distributes them
on-demand. The proposed architecture offers two main advantages: (i) automates the configuration
of WireGuard tunnels, and (ii) reduces state in the data plane by creating security associations
only if a particular tunnel is required. This control plane can be used to automate deployment,
especially in enterprise or ISP scenarios with a large amount of peers. We also took advantage of
WireGuard to secure the control plane channel between the nodes and the centralized server. In
addition, we have discussed the main challenges, such as pushing the sender’s public key to the
destination, and possible additions like virtual networking or multi-homing, in order to support
the aforementioned use cases. Finally, we have presented the design of our implementation, an
evaluation of the overhead of such control plane, and performance measurements to validate that
we retain the throughput and mobility benefits of WireGuard.
Chapter 6
A Design for Current Enterprise
Networks
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a design for current Enterprise Networks (EN). Following an analysis of
the challenges that EN face today, we designed a solution based on overlay networks that leverages
state of the art architectures and protocols. Current Enterprise Networks (EN) present a high
degree of complexity derived from their organic evolution. Traditional ENs are built in a three-
tier structure [154, 155]: access, distribution and core, with each layer leveraging a distinct set
of protocols (figure 6.1). The access-distribution segment uses L2 technologies such as Virtual
Local Area Networks (VLANs), Spanning Tree Protocol (STP), and VLAN Access Control Lists
(ACLs). On the other hand, the distribution-core segment is usually L3 with a combination of
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), Multiprotocol Label Switching with Label Distribution Protocol
(MPLS-LDP), and IP ACLs. This design varies from deployment to deployment, but the end
result are complex networks that can be running up to tens of different protocols across hundreds
of switches. This makes it hard to adapt to new requirements, such as isolating IoT devices
or stretching L2 domains across distributed locations. Even if some of these challenges might
have been addressed by technologies designed for service providers, such as Virtual Routing and
Forwarding (VRF), given the high port density required in typical campus networks, adopting the
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Figure 6.1: Classical design for enterprise networks.
Specifically, current ENs lack three key elements. First, scalable endpoint mobility across all
the enterprise facilities, to address the ever-increasing amount of roaming devices. Usually this
is handled via sending all wireless traffic through centralized Wireless LAN (WLAN) controllers,
which limits scalability, and reduces bandwidth. Second, simple to operate segmentation. The
most common forms of segmentation in ENs are VLANs or VRFs, which do not scale well and can
be difficult to configure at scale. Another example are IP-based ACLs, that over time can easily
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become long and difficult to map to the original intent. Third, simplified operations. Network
administrators might configure each router individually, and, as we mentioned previously, have to
deal with a myriad of different protocols. Although there exist more modern solutions [156, 157]
that satisfy some of these requirements, we believe that the state of the art does not deal with
scale and dynamism in a cost-effective manner, i.e. without requiring large capital expenditures
(CAPEX).
CAPEX plays, indeed, a very important role in the context of Enterprise Networks. First,
because of brownfield deployments: typically, network administrators do not want to upgrade all
of their switches for new features. Since these are usually legacy devices with limited features, new
network designs require a way to add new functionality without a forklift upgrade. Second, because
deploying devices with reduced FIB size or CPU power decreases CAPEX but in turn means less
powerful devices that require resource optimization.
This chapter presents the rationale, implementation, evaluation and experience matured in
deploying SDA (Software Defined Access). The objective of SDA is to address the aforementioned
requirements of modern EN. SDA leverages a vast spectrum of research ideas, architectures and
protocols produced by the community in the last decade [8, 158, 10, 159, 109, 160], and integrates
them in a practical and deployable solution. First, we leveraged network overlays as discussed in
the Fabric architecture [10], in the form of the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP [133]). This
offers three benefits:
1. We can upgrade existing deployments (brownfields) with minimal touch.
2. Their layer of indirection makes it easy to support L3 mobility.
3. They make segmentation with VRFs more scalable.
Second, we applied the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) principle of centralized control to
track endpoint location, and map endpoints to segmentation policies across the whole network.
Finally, we chose a reactive protocol (LISP) to distribute network state to the data plane. In other
words, we populate the switches forwarding tables only if required by the active traffic pattern.
This reduces the overall switch requirements in terms of FIB size and CPU power which results in
reduced CAPEX.
This chapter has four main blocks. First, we elaborate on the limitations of current solutions,
and explain our approach. Then, we describe how we combine state of the art techniques to realize a
practical solution, along with its implementation. Third, we detail our experience through two real-
life deployments. First, a medium-sized enterprise campus network serving around 450 endpoints
that includes fixed hosts, mobile hosts, application servers, IoT devices, etc. We show that in this
scenario, our reactive protocol optimizes data plane state with a 70% reduction of FIB entries in
the data plane compared to solutions that store all the state in all routers (e.g. BGP). Second, a
large warehouse where hundreds of robots are moving at speed to fulfill shipping orders, such as
those ran by large on-line retailers. Here we evaluate the handover delay of 16,000 robots triggering
800 mobility events per second. Our solution achieves 5 times lower handover delay compared to
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existing approaches. Finally, we present our lessons learned from deploying SDA, such as reducing
the initial connection delay due to the reactive protocol, coping with connectivity issues in the
underlay or dealing with policy updates at scale.
6.2 Requirements and Design Decisions
This section delves deeper into the requirements of current ENs, explains limitations in the state
of the art and discusses design decisions, summarized in table 6.1.
Resource optimization
Routing protocols commonly found in enterprises, such as OSPF, IS-IS or BGP make it difficult to
reduce the FIB space without losing granularity. It is usual to leverage BGP prefix aggregation or
OSPF Areas to reduce the overall number of routes in the network, at the price of less granularity.
We approached this challenge by leveraging a reactive protocol (LISP in our implementation), rather
than a proactive. Instead of pushing all routing entries beforehand to the routers, we only retrieve
the necessary forwarding entries from a centralized server on-demand, and only for the routers that
need them [161, 160]. We track endpoints by their IP address, so that routers download routes for
the remote endpoints they need to reach, based on incoming traffic from local endpoints.
In addition, this reactive approach is helpful with mobility because we can reduce convergence
time. This arises from the fact that a reactive approach reduces the churn generated by the location
updates: we only notify the parties affected by a specific mobility event. We must remark that a
reactive protocol presents several challenges, such as a potential initial delay for the establishment
of flows (section 6.3.2), or detecting connectivity outages in the underlay (section 6.5 discusses our
learnings in this space).
Mobility
The current trend of wireless first makes it critical to support a large amount of wireless endpoints.
Traditionally, ENs handle mobility at L2 in a centralized way for both data plane and control
plane. A gateway device (WLAN controller) acts as a sink for all traffic from all access points,
performs access control, and re-injects it to the L3 network. This approach presents a serious
scalability limitation because the gateway device becomes a bottleneck1. In addition, it creates
triangular routing because all L3 traffic is forced to go to the gateway and then back to the actual
destination.
SDA tackles mobility at layer 3 using network overlays [162, 163], specifically with the mobility
features of LISP. We keep the wireless control plane centralized for authentication purposes, but
we let packets coming from the access point to be directly routed to destination. This distributed
data plane greatly increases scalability.
1Although this particular concern can be alleviated with hierarchical controllers, it comes at the price of increased




































prefix aggregation route learning device-level granularity
Mobility
L2 centralized Scalability, L3 centralized control, Increased scalability,
control and data plane triangular routing distributed data plane optimized routing
Segmentation VLANs and VRFs
Scalability, Limited L2 stretching, Increased scale
network-wide policies ’centralized’ VRFs with less resources
Simplified VLAN and Error-prone,
Group-based policies
Smaller ACLs, end-
administration IP-based ACLs no mobility to-end enforcement
Table 6.1: Summary of current state of the art, challenges, and design decisions
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Segmentation
Traditionally, the most common form of segmentation in enterprise networks are Virtual Local Area
Networks (VLANs [164]) and Virtual Routing and Forwarding tables (VRFs [165]). Despite their
simplicity, the scope of VLANs must be kept limited to prevent flooding of broadcast traffic or L2
forwarding loops, hence, they do not scale well. Regarding VRFs, they scale better than VLANs,
but since each device has to be individually configured it is hard to implement global polices across
the whole network. A direct consequence is that administration becomes too cumbersome as the
number of VRFs increases. In addition, both of these approaches present similar limitations that
make it hard to deal with mobility at scale.
SDA addresses these issues at different levels: for L2 segmentation [8, 166], we carefully stretch
L2 domains (c.f. section 6.3.5). For L3, we still use VRFs, but map local VRFs to global virtual
networks in order to handle L3 segmentation at scale. This way, network administrators only have
to specify the virtual network for each endpoint [159]. Finally, we add a layer of indirection to ease
administration, detailed in the next paragraph.
Simplified administration
A direct consequence of using network primitives such as IP addresses or VLANs for segmentation
and access control is operational complexity [167]. In other words, network administrators have
to translate business intent into IP addresses and ACLs, and backwards. In the long run, this
approach does not scale, is error prone, and increases complexity.
To overcome this problem, we make use of the well-established group-based paradigm [109, 168]
to define ACLs between groups, instead of IP prefixes. First, the network operator defines a
connectivity matrix among all groups. Then it adds endpoints to each group. On the network
level, routers track each endpoint by its IP address and add a 16-bit tag representing its group, so
they can enforce the connectivity rules in the matrix. The benefit is that network administration
is radically simplified and common operations, such as IP address planning or ACL configurations
can be automated.
6.3 Design and Implementation
In this section, we describe the design and implementation details of SDA. First we provide an
overview, then we describe the control plane and data plane. Finally, we detail how we support



















































Endpoint auth. + VN + GroupId
Figure 6.2: Global design
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On a conceptual level our design presents the usual data/control plane layer separation typical
of SDN [6]. Figure 6.2 presents an overview of the design. We expose a simple declarative interface
for network operators to define:
1. The group and Virtual Network (VN) of each endpoint
2. The endpoint authentication data
3. The connectivity matrix across groups of endpoints
We store this information in the control plane in two different servers, a routing server and a
policy server. The policy server authenticates endpoints, assigns them a group and configures the
data plane routers with the required group rules from the connectivity matrix. The routing server
keeps track of all endpoints by their IP address and provides routes upon demand by the data
plane.
On the data plane, the overlay routers -hereafter referred to as edge routers- enforce the connec-
tivity matrix and route packets to the corresponding edge router. A special border router provides
access to external networks. Finally, endpoints can roam freely across edge routers.
6.3.2 Control Plane
We based the control plane design on a database-focused approach similar to [158], as opposed to
more traditional designs [169–171]. The control plane consists of two logically centralized servers:
policy server and routing server. The reason for this separation is that usually the host onboarding
process needs both the endpoint credentials and group permissions, while the normal packet flow
only needs the location mappings. Note that some deployments may have more than one routing
server or policy server for redundancy and load balancing. Table 6.2 presents a summary of all our
control plane data.











Endpoint VN + Overlay Underlay IP address
Edge Routers
Location IP address (i.e. edge router)
Table 6.2: Types of Control Plane Data
Control Plane Policy Sever
We offer two degrees of segmentation: Virtual Networks (VN), and the group connectivity matrix.
These group rules are independent for each VN. On one hand, VNs offer strong isolation at a
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’macro’ level. An example is a hospital network, where we want to isolate the network for doctors,
guests and medical devices. We never expect them to be able to communicate with each other.
This is especially relevant to isolate legacy devices susceptible to attacks, e.g. an MRI machine
running an outdated OS. In addition, it is a way to mitigate lateral spread attacks.
On the other hand, the group rules offer a ’micro’ segmentation for finer grain control inside a
VN. For example, this level of segmentation can separate different types of devices within a VN in
Bring Your Own Device scenarios.
The policy server stores the connectivity rules from the connectivity matrix, and, for each
endpoint: its authentication data, and associated GroupId and VN. GroupId and VN are 16-bit
and 24-bit identifiers, respectively. The authentication data is variable since we support different
RADIUS-based authentication protocols [172], both with EAP or without. We use a specific proto-
col, Scalable-Group Tag eXchange Protocol (SXP [173]) to distribute the GroupIds and connectivity
rules to edge routers. From the network perspective, VNs are mapped to isolated routing-switching
domains, while GroupIds are inputs to group-based ACLs.
Control Plane Routing Server
The routing server stores the endpoint location, i.e. pairs of overlay-to-underlay IP addresses plus
its associated VN. The overlay IP is the IP used by endpoints, while the underlay IP is the IP of
the edge router serving this endpoint. The other edge routers encapsulate traffic for such endpoint
towards the underlay IP. After a successful device onboarding (section 6.3.3), or upon detecting a
mobility event, edge routers update the underlay location of an overlay IP address. Edge routers
also retrieve this mapping when they receive a connection request to a particular device. The
routing server is implemented leveraging the control plane aspects of the Locator/ID Separation
Protocol (LISP, [133]).
In a nutshell, the LISP control plane offers two messages: Map Request, to retrieve the underlay
address of an overlay endpoint, and Map Register, to update the location of an endpoint, i.e. the
overlay to underlay mapping. This way, we can store in the data plane the overlay to underlay
mappings that are required by the edge router to serve incoming traffic. In addition, the LISP
control plane supports mobility, is well suited for SDN architectures [9], and accommodates different
overlay address families apart from IP, e.g MAC addresses. This is especially helpful to support L2
services (section 6.3.5).
Border Router
A drawback of using a reactive protocol such as LISP is the initial packet loss until the edge router
downloads the route for a new destination. We have overcome this issue by installing a default
route in all edge routers that points to the border router, and by synchronizing the routing state
in the border with the information in the routing server (sync arrow in figure 6.2). This way, edge
routers forward packets to the border until they finish the resolution process, during this time the
border router forwards such packets to the destination (dashed line in figure 6.3). The border
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Figure 6.3: Initial packet loss reduction with default entry in edge routers.
6.3.3 Data Plane
The data plane presents two distinct routers (figure 6.2): edge and border.
Edge Routers
Edge routers perform four key functions:
1. Encapsulate and decapsulate traffic from and to endpoints, respectively.
2. Provide inter-VN isolation (’macro’ segmentation). We implement such segmentation with
VRFs: LISP populates the VRF tables, and each entry has an associated GroupId.
3. Detect roaming endpoints and update their location in the routing server.
4. Enforce group permissions from the connectivity matrix (’micro’ segmentation).
Border Routers
Border routers perform the same functions as edge routers, with two exceptions. First, their FIB
table is synchronized with the routing server. In other words, they don’t use a reactive protocol,
rather they are subscribed to all route updates from the routing server [174]. And second, they
have routes to other networks, e.g. Internet, datacenter. Because of this, border routers have more
powerful CPU and larger FIB tables.
Encapsulation and Underlay
The data plane encapsulation leverages VXLAN with Group Identifier extension [175]. We chose
this encapsulation over the native LISP data plane because of the need to encapsulate both L2 and
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L3 payloads (LISP supports L3 only). Additionally, in this VXLAN variant we can add the source
GroupId in the group field (figure 6.4). Finally, the underlay is a network with plain IP connectivity
that routes encapsulated packets between edge routers. The underlay routing is provided by either
OSPF or IS-IS, we leverage MACsec [176] for packet integrity protection and confidentiality, and
ECMP for redundancy [177].
Underlay src., 




Inner IP packetVXLAN header
Figure 6.4: Packet Format
Host Onboarding
When an endpoint connects to the overlay for the first time, the edge router detects it and starts the
authentication process with the policy server (step 1 in figure 6.5). After a successful authentication,
the edge router downloads the endpoint’s VN, GroupId, and associated connectivity rules from
the policy server (step 2). Specifically, it downloads the rules where the endpoint’s group is the
destination (c.f. section 6.5.3), stores locally the GroupId value, and associates it to the switch
port where the endpoint is connected. Then it can assign an overlay IP address to the endpoint
(step 3), obtained from a DHCP server. Finally, the edge router stores the location of the endpoint
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Request
Figure 6.5: Host Onboarding Process
Common Packet Flow
On ingress, packets from endpoints are assigned their corresponding GroupId and VN (figure 6.6,
ingress edge router). The router knows these values from the onboarding process. Then, it does
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a VN + overlay destination IP lookup in the VRF table for that VN. If there is no match, it will
query the control plane database. This query returns the underlay IP address of the destination
overlay IP. Finally, the packet is encapsulated towards the corresponding edge router, carrying both
VN and GroupId.
On egress, the destination edge router decapsulates the packet and injects it into a two-stage
pipeline (figure 6.6, egress edge router). First, it performs a VN + overlay destination IP lookup
in the local VRF table corresponding to the VN in the packet. This query returns the output port
and the associated destination GroupId. Each entry in the VRF has its associated GroupId, that is
stored during the onboarding process. After authentication, the edge router creates an (Overlay
IP, GroupId tag) association in the VRF table.
The second stage is an exact match lookup in an group-based ACL of (source GroupId, desti-
nation GroupId). This ACL enforces the aforementioned group rules. Finally, the router forwards
the packet to the destination overlay IP address. We perform the policy enforcement on egress due





















































VN + Overlay IP à
Underlay IP
Endpoint auth. à VN + GroupId
(GroupId A, GroupId B, Allow)
Figure 6.6: Ingress and egress pipelines
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6.3.4 Mobility Support
When an endpoint roams and attaches to a new edge router, the latter triggers the authentication
process again, and registers the new location (figure 6.7, step 1). After this registration, the
control plane sends a message to the previous edge router instructing it to: (i) pull the new
location data (2,3), and (ii) forward all traffic for that particular endpoint to the new edge router.
Hence, handover signaling is linear with the number of roaming endpoints, as opposed to proactive

















Figure 6.7: Endpoint mobility
Additionally, we apply the event-driven approach to update edge routers storing stale entries.
To this purpose, we use a specific data-triggered control plane message (figure 6.8): when the old
edge router receives traffic for the roaming endpoint (1) it sends a control message to the source
(2), instructing it to retrieve the new location (4). At the same time, the old destination router
forwards this traffic to the new destination router (3).
Regarding signaling scalability, this method depends on traffic patterns: if the roaming end-
point is very popular, we will have to update a significant portion of edge routers. On the contrary,
endpoints that receive traffic from few sources, require less signaling. The advantage of this tech-
nique is that it is triggered by traffic, in other words, the control plane doesn’t need to update all
edge routers that have the stale location, but only those that require it. Finally, these control plane
messages will be staggered over time as traffic from different senders will arrive at different times,
thus spreading the signaling load in time.
6.3.5 Support for L2 services
In enterprise scenarios, it is common that some devices or users require L2 connectivity. Common




















Figure 6.8: Updating stale entries via data plane messages.
or service discovery (a significant amount of applications rely on broadcast domains, e.g. Apple
Bonjour).
In order to support such services, but avoid sending broadcast traffic to the entire network, our
implementation leverages four elements:
1. VLANs, but limited to the edge router ports.
2. Indexing endpoints by MAC address in the routing server, in addition to IP address.
3. Storing overlay IP to MAC pairs in the routing server.
4. Deployment of L2 gateways in edge routers.
The combination of these four elements helps us to provide scalable L2 connectivity: first,
VLANs limit broadcast domains; second, MAC address indexing locates endpoints of the same
VLAN that are in different edge routers. Finally, L2 gateways absorb broadcast traffic and convert
it to unicast: for instance, they capture ARP requests and perform a lookup in the routing server
to find the MAC associated to the IP in the ARP request. Then they use this MAC to replace the
broadcast MAC in the ARP request, creating a unicast L2 message. This message is injected in
the L2 pipeline, which will use the MAC-to-underlay IP to encapsulate the request to the intended
L2 MAC.
6.4 Evaluation
SDA is implemented in a commercially available line of routers, leveraging the protocols mentioned
previously: LISP [133], RADIUS [172], and Scalable-Group Tag eXchange Protocol [173] for the
control plane, and VXLAN [22] for the data plane. We have deployed our implementation in
two different real-life scenarios: two campus networks with 150 and 450 endpoints, and a large
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warehouse (partially emulated) with massive mobility serving 16,000 emulated endpoints. Table
6.3 presents a summary of their characteristics.
Deployment
# Border # Edge Number of
Routers Routers endpoints
Building A 1 7 150




Table 6.3: Deployments used for evaluation
We evaluated three key elements of SDA: first, the response of the routing server under stressful
conditions, because it is critical in the process of establishing new data flows. Second, quantifying
the state optimization in the data plane due to the edge-border design. And third, assess the
difference between a proactive and a reactive protocol in face of massive mobility events.
6.4.1 Routing Server Scalability
The routing server is a critical part of the design, because it allows establishing communication
between any pair of endpoints. Because of this, we evaluated its performance depending on the
number of routes and queries per second.
To this end, we setup a routing server implemented in a commercial virtual router with 8
GB RAM, 8 vCPU, on top of a virtualization platform with an 8-core 2.1 GHz processor. We
measured the delay to answer route requests and route updates with a script running in a local
machine that sent 800 queries per second. We repeated the experiment for different number of
routes configured in the routing server. Each query requested or updated a different route, in
order to avoid optimizations due to intermediate caches. We consider the network delay negligible.
Figures 6.9a and 6.9b present boxplots of the time required to answer an IPv4 route request and
a route update, respectively, for four different number of configured routes in the routing server.
The values are relative to the minimum delay of a routing server with only one route.
We can see that the delay is not dependent on the number of routes. Since this architecture
is designed to store network state hierarchically, it makes it easy to implement the routing server
with a Patricia Trie. The delay of this data structure depends on the number of bits of the
keys, not the number of elements [178]. Based on the data collected for this particular test,
an equivalent deployment using a similar setup should scale to at least 3k endpoints without
noticeable performance degradation. Each endpoint requires registering 3 routes (IPv4, IPv6 and
MAC addresses), then 10k / 3 = ∼3k.
We chose to send 800 queries/s to the server since it is the peak requirement in the massive
mobility scenario (section 6.4.3). We consider this a highly loaded server, however, in case we
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(a) Boxplot (95%) of the delay of 10k route requests
for four different number of configured routes.
(b) Boxplot (95%) of the delay of 10k route updates
for four different number of configured routes.
Figure 6.9: Routing server performance evaluation depending on the number of stored routes. The
values are relative to the minimum delay of a routing server with only one route.
needed to increase such figure, the architecture scales horizontally and can deploy more routing
servers. Then, we load balance across edge routers by grouping them and pointing each group to
a different routing server for the route requests, and perform route updates on all servers.
Finally, using the same routing server as before, we repeated the previous experiment but
for different number of queries/s. Figure 6.10 presents boxplots of the delay to answer IPv4 route
requests for four different number of queries per second to the routing server. The values are relative
to the minimum delay of all samples. Assuming a mobility pattern similar to the warehouse scenario
(section 6.4.3) with 800 moves/s and that each move triggers 2 queries to the routing server, we
conclude that the routing server could support this use case (800*2 = 1600 queries/s).
Figure 6.10: Boxplot (95%) of the delay of route requests for four different number of queries per
second. Values are relative to the minimum of all.
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6.4.2 State Reduction
In order to quantify the state reduction due to the reactive protocol, we counted the number of
overlay-to-underlay IPv4 mappings in the FIB of the edge and border routers. We setup a VM
that collected this data hourly from the router CLI. The routers were in two separate buildings (A
and B), with three floors each, and providing network connectivity to between 200 and 500 users.
Table 6.4 provides additional details about each deployment, and figure 6.11 shows the network
topology. The control plane of border routers has a 4-core 2.4GHz, x86 CPU with 16 GB RAM,
and edge routers a 4-core 1.8 GHz, x86 CPU with 8 GB RAM. Both of them use a custom ASIC
for the data plane. The border-to-edge links are 10 Gbps and the edge-to-AP 1 Gbps.
Bldg. A Bldg. B
Border Routers 1 2
Edge Routers 7 6
Floors 3 3
AP per floor 40 40
Total AP 120 120
AP per edge ∼20 20







x20 x20 x20 x20 x20 x20
Figure 6.11: Campus Network Topology (underlay routers not shown for clarity)
Figure 6.12 shows the average number of FIB entries for the border and edge routers, for both
buildings, and for three different weeks. We can see that, on average, edge routers store less FIB
entries than border routers: in building A edge routers carry only about 30% of the FIB entries on
the border routers, while in building B this figure is as low as 6%. Table 6.5 presents also averages
of FIB entries for border and edge routers for a period of 5 weeks. We can also see reductions in
FIB entries, even if we calculate separate averages for day and nighttime. We can conclude that
the reactive approach helps in optimizing data plane state, while the border router absorbs the
convergence delay of the route resolution.
It is also worth mentioning that the usage pattern of the FIB table on border routers shows a
common daily and weekly pattern: during daytime in working week days routers host more routes
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than during nighttime and over weekends. This is due to the fact that the border router is always
up to date with the information in the routing server regarding the endpoints in the deployment.
Thus, the number of entries in the border router follows closely the presence of authenticated users
in the network, i.e. users in the office. In contrast, edge routers cache routes learned on demand
and may retain them during longer periods, even when users have left the office. We can clearly
see this in building A (figure 6.12, top row), where edge routers seem to keep their routes for most
of the time between workdays, but eventually clear they caches during weekend (note that the
edge router cache entries have a timeout of 24h). On the other hand, this effect is less noticeable
in building B, where edge routers follow the daytime/nighttime routine more closely. The reason
behind this could be nighttime traffic patterns: when some endpoints leave the office at night, the
remaining ones may initiate communication with those that left, that will trigger a route resolution
with a negative result, and thereby deleting that FIB entry.
Finally, another relevant aspect of building B is a substantial amount of end-hosts that are
permanently connected to the network and do not follow the day/night routine. Examples of such
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Figure 6.12: Number of FIB entries in border vs. edge router for three different weeks. Top row corresponds to building A, bottom row
building to B.
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6.4.3 Massive Mobility Events
In this experiment we focus on the handover delay of large mobility events for a reactive and
proactive protocol. We recreated in the lab the specifications of a real life deployment, a large
warehouse with hundreds of robots continuously roaming across WiFi access points. Figure 6.13
presents the topology:
 A commercial border router, 4-core 2 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM for the control plane, custom
ASIC in the data plane, and with an embedded routing server.
 Two commercial edge routers, 4-core 1.8 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM for the control plane, and
custom ASIC in the data plane.





Traffic Generator 198x Emulated
BGP / LISP
800 moves/s
Figure 6.13: Warehouse Network Topology
We configured the traffic generator to: (i) create unidirectional UDP traffic from the 200 edge
routers towards the border router (yellow arrow in figure 6.13), (ii) send 1500 bytes packets from
16,000 emulated hosts, and (iii) generate 800 mobility events per second by changing the attachment
port of the end hosts between the two physical edge routers. We selected this amount of mobility
events because in the real-life scenario, around 5% of the endpoints change their attachment point
every second.
We measured the convergence time as the handover delay, i.e. the time since the emulated host
is detached until traffic is restored after it attaches to the new edge router. In order to compare
both proactive and on-demand approaches, we measured the handover delay in the same topology,
but with two different control plane configurations: BGP as the proactive, and LISP as the reactive.
In the BGP case we used a centralized route-reflector in the edge router to distribute route updates.
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Figure 6.14 plots the CDF of the handover delay for BGP and LISP. All values are normalized
to the minimum convergence time observed during the measurement process. We can see that the
proactive solution takes around 10 times more to converge than the reactive one. The reason is that
the proactive approach replicates network updates to all 200 edge routers, while the on-demand




















Figure 6.14: Handover delay for event-driven (LISP) and proactive (BGP) protocols
Another important observation is that the variance of the handover delay is consistently higher
in the proactive approach than the reactive. This is due to the fact that the reactive architecture
selectively updates only routers that are actively sending traffic to the end-host that moved, while
the proactive approach updates edge routers randomly, i.e. not by their need for such update.
These results show that SDA’s reactive approach can be beneficial in stressed environments such
as automated warehouses or large gatherings with highly mobile end-hosts.
6.5 Lessons Learned
In this section we summarize several challenges and our learnings from implementing and deploying
SDA in enterprise networks.
6.5.1 Underlay Connectivity Issues
In order for the overlay to work, there needs to be underlay connectivity. However, it is possible
that an edge router fails or that an underlay IP changes, interrupting normal traffic flow. It can
be challenging for the overlay to know the state of the underlay without explicit probing. To cope
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with these situations, edge routers monitor the address announcements of the underlay routing
protocol (IS-IS or OSPF) to know about their reachability to underlay IP addresses of the other
edge routers. This way, when they detect a connectivity outage, they update their local forwarding
table deleting such route and falling back to the default route to the border, until a new edge router
registers the overlay address in the routing server.
6.5.2 Edge Routers Rebooting
One issue that can happen is a forwarding loop between the edge and border router. First, assume
the network is forwarding traffic, and an edge router reboots. It will start with an empty FIB for
the overlay entries. When it receives traffic for one of its former endpoints, it will use the default
route and forward it back to the border router, since it does not know yet its endpoints. Then, the
border router will forward this traffic to the rebooted router according to its current information,
creating a forwarding loop.
Although this loop is transient and disappears once the edge router detects its endpoints, we
rely on two mechanisms in such situation. First, since the edge router will not announce its underlay
IP address through the underlay routing protocol while rebooting, the tracking of the connectivity
state of the underlay IP address that the other edge routers perform will remove the routes to the
rebooting edge router. Second, the rebooting router will not recognize the incoming traffic, so it
will send the data plane message we mentioned in section 6.3.4 to the originating edge router. This
will trigger a refresh in the overlay FIB entries of the sending edge router.
6.5.3 Selecting the Policy Enforcement Point
In this section we discuss a bandwidth vs. network state trade-off related to the deployment of
group policies. On one hand, we can save bandwidth by enforcing policies on ingress, because we
don’t forward traffic that will be dropped on egress. On the other hand, we can reduce data plane
state by enforcing them on egress, because we only need policies for the local destination groups of
the endpoints that are attached to a particular edge router. Note that on ingress we would need
policies for all possible destination groups, thereby increasing data plane state. Taking this into
account, we chose to enforce policies on egress to reduce overall state in the data plane.
In order to quantify the wasted bandwidth due to enforcing on egress, we analyzed the packet
drops due to group-based ACLs in a real-life deployment leveraging egress-based policy enforcement.
This deployment is a medium-large enterprise network with a campus and a few branches. For our
analysis, we looked at three different devices in this deployment: a branch router, an edge device
in the campus, and a VPN gateway. Combined, these three devices were serving around 11,000
endpoints during the period we monitored them. Figure 6.15 presents the permille of dropped
traffic for the period of 5 days. We can see that in the worst case the drop rate is extremely low: 2
out of each 10k packets. The VPN router has a significantly larger amount of drops than the other
routers due to the fact that it receives all the traffic from remote users, which present a different
usage pattern from the users in the office.





















Figure 6.15: Permille hits on drop rules over all hits.
Since this deployment performs the policy enforcement on egress, we expected a significant
percentage of drops. Surprisingly, we discovered that after a new policy is applied, there is a
transient period with an increase in drops, but when endpoints (which are usually humans) realize
they cannot access this particular destination, they stop requesting it. Hence, the operational
experience in the most common enterprise use cases shows that enforcing policies on egress does
not impact significantly on the amount of wasted bandwidth.
An additional benefit of enforcing on egress is a simplification of signaling. When a group rule
is updated, it is necessary to notify all the affected edge routers. However, this is not easy in our
design, because requests to the control plane are only triggered by data plane events. For example,
consider that the policy check is implemented on ingress and that the edge router has already
learned the GroupId associated to a particular destination (figure 6.16, top part). Now suppose
that the group associated to this destination endpoint is updated, the ingress router has no way to
know it. Hence, we need a way to signal this change.
On the contrary, if the policy is enforced on egress, the (Overlay IP, GroupId) pair in the VRF
is automatically updated, because the modification of endpoint data automatically triggers the
authentication process again. In other words, on egress the (Overlay IP, GroupId) pair is always
up to date because it is linked to the endpoints connected to that edge router. This way, we can
avoid implementing an extra signaling mechanism, and the associated complexity.
6.5.4 Updating Policies
In our deployment experience, we found an interesting trade-off when updating policies: it can be
more scalable (i.e. less signaling) moving users to different groups rather than directly updating the
group-based ACLs. Indeed, this trade-off depends on the distribution of endpoints within groups
of each particular deployment, i.e. few groups with large amounts of endpoints vs. high number
of groups with few endpoints each. Thus, it is not always the case that changing the endpoint’s
group is more scalable, but here we present two examples from our experience:
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Figure 6.16: Policy Enforcement on Ingress (top) and Egress (bottom)
Acquisitions
In case of an acquisition of an enterprise, the new employees are progressively moved through
different groups until they get the same group as regular employees. The reverse also holds, when
part of a company is sold, their users are moved to a group that is associated with more restrictive
policies.
Service Insertion
It is common that traffic has to go through middleboxes, e.g a firewall or a WAN optimizer. In
some deployments, the SDA operators decide to update the group from the packets so that devices
in the service chain decide whether to apply a policy or not. In other words, instead of applying
different policies across the path for the same group, they change the group along the way so that
different policies are applied across this same path.
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6.6 Related Work
6.6.1 SDN Pioneering Work
Ethane [156], one of the first SDN designs, presents numerous similarities with our proposal: it
also targets enterprise networks, presents a similar architecture with a centralized controller, and
supports incremental deployment. However, Ethane specifically focuses on three key elements,
mostly around the control plane: (i) providing network access control, (ii) a rich high-level policy
language, and (iii) controller design and fault-tolerance. Conversely, SDA pays more attention to
data plane related aspects such as network isolation and resource efficiency.
Campus networks also motivated the inception of OpenFlow [6], that champions the decoupling
of data plane and control plane, gives a strong focus to the interface between the router and the
controller and defines and approach to implementing rich policies on capable switches. SDA in its
turn gives more emphasis to the ability to support scalability in heterogeneous environments with
devices with different capabilities.
Finally, SANE [179] offers a simple, high-level policy interface like the one used by SDA, but
tackles the problem in the border between L2 and L3 and does not trust the data plane routers.
6.6.2 BeyondCorp and Zero Trust Networks
In terms of securing the enterprise network, a closely related work is Beyond Corp [27], also known
as the Zero Trust model. Like SDA, Beyond Corp focuses on access control between network
endpoints, with an especial emphasis on user-to-server connections. On the other hand, it should
be noted that networking improvements (e.g. seamless mobility, etc) are not in the scope of
BeyondCorp and therefore this section only discusses how SDA relates to BeyondCorp in terms of
enterprise security.
BeyondCorp offers a solid approach to build secure enterprise networks by means of keeping
healthy endpoints and redirecting traffic through access proxies. By doing so, BeyondCorp presents
a security model that is agnostic to the underlying networking infrastructure. While this is a
reasonable approach in certain scenarios, in our operational experience we have found certain
enterprise requirements that are hard to meet with a BeyondCorp-only approach. First, while
BeyondCorp protects the access to the enterprise network, its focus is on protecting the access to
enterprise applications at layer 7. However, it is not always possible to redirect traffic through
the proxies (e.g. L2 traffic). Second, despite enterprise efforts around building healthy fleets of
devices, the reality we observe is that insecure devices are still present in typical enterprise networks,
even more due to the explosion of different IoT devices. These endpoints make the BeyondCorp
approach harder to implement and, in many cases, secure on-boarding and admission still need
to be performed by the network infrastructure. Third, with only a BeyondCorp security model
the overall network performance could be degraded by malicious actors attempting to get access
(even if unsuccessful) or explicitly looking to disrupt the network operation. SDA operates lower
in the stack and not only protects the connection of devices to the network but also the network
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infrastructure itself. We believe that SDA complements BeyondCorp, and the combination of both
could contribute to strengthen the overall security of an enterprise network.
6.6.3 Other Related Work
Software Resolved Networks [157] also leverages a reactive protocol (DNS extensions) and a cen-
tralized database, but requires involving endpoints when resolving routes, and allows a wider range
of policies than our proposal.
Other proposals for enterprise networks center their work on specific elements of an enterprise
network, such as ACL configurations [167], systematic design of VLANs and ACL placement [180]
or incremental SDN deployment [181].
6.7 Summary of Outcomes
In this chapter we have presented SDA, a solution designed for modern enterprise networks. The
main goal of the architecture is supporting emerging requirements, with a strong focus on mobility,
segmentation, and incremental deployment. At the same time, it provides scalability and optimizes
data plane resources for heterogeneous environments with devices of diverse capabilities.
SDA leverages common practices in networking such as centralized control or network overlays,
and makes use of a reactive approach to distribute network information and support mobility. Our
experimental results show that, when compared with traditional approaches, SDA exceeds a 70%
reduction in the overall forwarding state used by the network. Also, in very large deployments that
need to deal with massive mobility events, network convergence is an order of magnitude faster
than the status quo. For all these reasons we believe that SDA successfully addresses the unique re-
quirements of modern enterprise networks that include scalable mobility, end-to-end segmentation,
simplified administration, and overall resource optimization.
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Chapter 7
A Design for Future Enterprise
Networks
109
110 CHAPTER 7. A DESIGN FOR FUTURE ENTERPRISE NETWORKS
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a design for future enterprise networks. First we explain the requirements
we believe are necessary for such networks, and then we present a design that strives to fulfill them.
We base our requirements, analysis, and design on the following use case. Consider an employee of
a company that:
 Has several devices, e.g. smartphone, laptop. Some may be owned by the company, others
by the employee.
 Needs to access the Internet, the company’s application servers, and several cloud services.
 Wants to connect from virtually anywhere: company office, home, cafeteria, etc., and without
noticeable difference for the user.
 The applications have different QoS requirements, ranging from email to real-time videocon-
ferencing.
And that the company also requires:
 A way to define and apply policies.
 Support different kinds of applications, either web-based or not.
 Confidentiality for all communications
 Employee identification
In order to support this use case, we extracted a list of concrete requirements from the previous
list, and designed a data and control plane architecture that can satisfy them. We leveraged part of
our knowledge of VPNs and overlay networks from the previous chapters to build a layered stack.
In such stack, each layer is represented by a protocol header, and we assign a single function to
the headers. We must remark that this layered approach is not actually novel, rather it is already
present in the wild. In a nutshell, our contributions are:
1. Formalize a trend that is already present in the global Internet.
2. Reduce the semantic overload of current headers: since our design assigns a unique function
to each header, we reduce complexity and simplify the implementations of some functions.
The most common example is using IP addresses to identify endpoints or users, while IP
addresses should be used only to route packets. This type of coupling makes management
and policy enforcement more complex, i.e. an endpoint cannot change its IP address because
it would loose access to services that use it for identification.
3. Focus on enterprise use cases.
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7.2 Requirements
Here we specify the technical requirements extracted from the previous high-level requisites, and
their rationale.
Ability to traverse the public Internet: in order to connect from anywhere, we need a header
that can be routed in the public Internet. This translates to using TCP or UDP on top of IP.
Seamless mobility and multi-homing: basically, this requisite comes from the need to support
switching between WiFi and LTE interfaces in smartphones without breaking established
connections, e.g. in conference calls. Or to be able to use both interfaces at the same time
(multi-homing) to increase throughput, e.g. uploading a large file. Finally, it simplifies
connecting from different devices.
Confidentiality: if we’re crossing the public Internet, and we’re in an enterprise scenario, it is
essential to guarantee the confidentiality of any communication.
Policy: two key aspects (but not the only ones) of policy in an enterprise scenario are QoS and
access control.
 Regarding QoS, it is valuable to have mechanisms to improve connection metrics. For
example, reducing video call latency, or decreasing cost in large data transfers that are
not time sensitive, e.g. backups.
 With respect to access control, we need a way to identify endpoints, group them, and
control the resources they can access, as we saw in chapter 6. This is also related to the
next requirement, identity.
Identity: in enterprise scenarios, it is important to provide a way to authenticate users easily
instead of credentials based on user and password. In addition, in this case identity also
refers to application identity. If the network is able to easily map packets to applications or
services, then:
 QoS and policy enforcement are more simple: no need to perform Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI), just use the label in the packet header.
 If the application labeling is implemented correctly, it can increase privacy versus other
solutions. For example, a label that maps to ’latency < 50 ms’ offers more privacy
than ’VIP conferencing call’.
Support for applications using the socket API: as we’ll see later, in some cases the socket
API that we expose to applications is not the standard one that uses IP and port. Since we
augment the network layer with additional features, we need to expose them to the applica-
tion, e.g. user identity. However, since the existing code base uses the well-established socket
API, we have to support it.
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7.3 Design
Table 7.1 presents the layered stack that is the basis of our approach, with a brief description and
the function of each layer. Then, table 7.2 translates these layers to a candidate protocol that can
implement them. The sign ∗ denotes that the protocol needs modifications.
Layer Description Function








the endpoint or user
Confidentiality Data to encrypt the layers above Confidentiality
Routing Standard IP headers Routing, mobility










Routing Plain IP + UDP
Table 7.2: Proposed protocol stack.
The custom header carries information about policies and identity, with the fields detailed in
table 7.3. These fields are used to enforce policies and offer applications a different socket API with
extended characteristics. Specifically:
 userID identifies the specific user in the endpoint, and is used to create security associations
for the confidentiality header and to identify users in applications that require login.
 groupID is an identifier of a collection of users, similar to the one in section 6.3.2. It is used
to apply access control policies.
 appID identifies the application in the data packets, so it can be used to provide different
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QoS levels for each application. We are assuming that these fields are inserted either by a
trusted software on the endpoint or the first hop router (section 7.4).
 Together, userID and appID can be offered to the application to authenticate users if needed.
Field Description
socket API=1
A bit that indicates if the application is using the standard
socket API (section 7.3.1) or the application and user fields.
userID User identifier within the enterprise network.
groupID Group identifier to which the userID belongs.
appID Identifier for the application that the user is accessing.
Table 7.3: Fields in the custom header.
In addition, we can see that this layered stack can support the aforementioned requirements.
First, the custom header is used to apply different kinds of policies and identify users. Second,
the WireGuard header provides confidentiality. Third, the plain IP + UDP header can cross the
Internet easily. Finally, since the IP address in the IP header is not linked to the endpoint, it can
change freely, thereby allowing mobility and multi-homing. Note that for multi-homing we need
cooperation form the control plane, as described in section 7.4.
7.3.1 Support for Socket API
Table 7.4 adds an additional IP layer before the transport layer, so that applications that use
the socket API have access to an IP + port pair to open sockets. The custom header uses the





determined by the application




Routing Plain IP + UDP
Table 7.4: Proposed protocol stack with support for standard socket API (IP + port).
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7.3.2 Extended Socket API
In case we’re not using the standard socket API, we offer applications a different kind of socket with
extended functionalities. For example, they can use the userID field to authenticate application
users. Or they don’t need confidentiality at application level, that is, TLS, because all connections
are encrypted at L3. In addition, in order to keep transport protocols unmodified, we can use the
mapping system to tell applications which port to use in case they are not aware of it. Another
option is using new transport independent socket APIs that offer similar additional functionalities
[182].
7.4 Deployment
In our target deployment, we make the following assumptions:
 We have a collection of WAN routers across the Internet that can process the custom header.
In conjunction they form a Software-Defined WAN (SDWAN).
 We have one or more servers acting as a control plane; they host a key-value database with
different information required to establish connections.
 We can modify the host protocol stack, either in endpoints or servers, so they can use the
custom header and the extended socket API. This stack is trusted.
 In case we cannot modify the host stack, or we don’t trust it, the endpoints or servers work as
usual, with the IP + port socket API. Then the WAN routers add and remove the necessary
headers. In addition,
– Endpoints are able to create a secure tunnel to the nearest WAN router, either with
IPsec or WireGuard.
– Servers are connected to a WAN router in their datacenter, or have an IPsec or Wire-
Guard tunnel towards the nearest.
Figure 7.1 presents an example of a deployment of such architecture. Consider an endpoint
that wants to connect to the on-premise servers in the enterprise, and that it supports our stack.
First, it will contact the mapping system to obtain the IP address of the closest WAN router, and
create the secure WireGuard tunnel. Then, it will ask for the necessary data to fill the custom
header, especially userID and groupID, and register its underlay IP in the mapping system. The
mapping system supports different types of queries and read / write operations depending on the
the requesting user.
After gathering all these data, the endpoint can start sending application data. Packets that
arrive at the WAN router are decapsulated and the router processes the custom header. Specifically,
the router checks if the user has the permission to access that application, and determines the best
destination router for the packet depending on the QoS associated to the application. The WAN
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router can map the fields in the custom headers to specific polices thanks to the information in the
mapping system. Then, the packet is routed across the necessary WAN routers. When it arrives at














Figure 7.1: Deployment example of the layered architecture. Some connections have been omitted
for clarity.
Regarding multi-homing, we leverage the control plane connection between the endpoint and
the mapping system to help the endpoint establish such connections. For example, the endpoint
can register two different underlay IP addresses in the mapping system, so the receiving WAN
router knows that the endpoint is not performing a handover but rather sending data from two
different interfaces. Another example is when the mapping system gives the IP addresses of two
WAN routers to the endpoint, so it can connect to a each router from a different interface (split
tunneling).
Finally, in case the endpoint cannot use the custom header, it establishes an IPsec tunnel to
the closest WAN router. Then, this router adds all the required headers on top of the regular IP
packet. For example, it retrieves the userID from the mapping system using the credentials from
the IPsec security association. Equivalently for the destination server.
7.5 Summary of Outcomes
In this chapter we have presented the basis of a design to support the emerging requirements
of enterprise networks. Such networks require confidential connections from any point on the
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Internet, and they need a way to implement application and user-specific polices. We have started
with a solution based on layers, where each layer performs a specific function, and translated each
layer to a protocol header. This way, we can offer mobility, multi-homing, data confidentiality,
access control, QoS, and user identification. However, this design needs future refinements, like
the packet processing in WAN routers, or the specification of an SDN southbound protocol that
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8.1 Contributions
In this thesis we have presented several improvements to different elements of overlay networks,
based on the latest trends in networking research, especially SDN and programmable dataplanes.
We have paid special attention to distributed mapping systems and southbound SDN protocols.
The following paragraphs summarize the contributions of each chapter of this thesis.
The fist part of the thesis has explored the applicability of blockchain technology to address
assignment, a topic that has received little attention when compared with financial applications or
Internet naming systems. Specifically, we have studied the relationship between IP addresses and
cryptographic tokens, that allows recording them in a blockchain. In order to understand better the
potential benefits of such technology, we have explored the similarities and differences of blockchain
technology and classical Public Key Infrastructure solutions. Moreover, thanks to a detailed study
of the state of the art of consensus algorithms for blockchains, we have presented two practical
use cases for blockchain-based address assignment. First, improving the security of inter-domain
routing, and second, establishing connections between collaborating but distrusting enterprises. In
both cases, we have paid special attention to the selection of the consensus algorithm, scalability
metrics like chain size or throughput, and other deployment considerations, such as dealing with
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses or simplifying the administrator’s job. Thanks to this work, we have
successfully shown that blockchain technology can be used to assign IP addresses, and that it
constitutes a feasible alternative to classic PKI designs.
The second part of the thesis has presented improvements in three aspects related to overlay
and enterprise networks: secure data planes, current enterprise networks, and future refinements for
enterprise networks. First, we have presented and evaluated a design to automate the deployment
of VPNs based on LISP and WireGuard. This design strives for simplicity, focusing on reducing
data plane state and connection establishment time. We have shown that we can automate the
deployment of a secure overlay network on top of the Internet, while avoiding complex systems like
DNS or certification authorities, and without impacting performance.
Second, we have reviewed the challenges of current enterprise networks, and discussed why
current practices are not sufficient. This analysis has helped in designing a solution based on
network overlays and state of the art research such as SDN centralized control, network databases,
or group-based policies. The usage of a reactive protocol for the routing part in this solution
is especially relevant, because this approach is not widespread in the industry although it can
yield interesting benefits. Specifically, we have proven how this different approach can reduce data
plane state and handover time, and, in turn, decrease router cost. Finally, we must remark that this
design has contributed in advancing the already mature field of research in enterprise networks, that
has seen few contributions in the last years. And third, by combining the previous contributions,
we have outlined an approach to extend enterprise networks outside of the campus. This design
aims to extend common enterprise functionalities like access control or confidentiality to endpoints
connected outside of the campus perimeter, and at the same time, support QoS, mobility and
multi-homing. We have chosen to clearly separate each function in a different layer, and use a
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centralized mapping system to distribute network state. Finally, we have presented a new socket
design that aims to provide more features to applications, along with an option to be compatible
with the current socket API.
8.2 Future Work
8.2.1 Blockchain Applications to Address Assignment
Regarding the application to inter-domain routing, the most relevant future work revolves around
adding all or part of the BGP AS-path in IPchain, so that BGP routers have additional data to
verify BGP messages. Specifically, it is worth investigating how to ensure that only authorized
neighboring ASes can append a new ASN, and a scalability analysis for this new data, because the
churn, throughput, and storage requirements are significantly higher. Indeed, this means storing
all of the active Internet BGP routes in the blockchain. On the performance side, it is worth
investigating data structures for efficient management of IP prefixes in the chain (split / merge
operations), and a detailed analysis on the PoS protocol scalability, e.g. how does the DKG group
size affect security and block time. On the same line, it is also interesting to review the applicability
of new consensus algorithms to this use case, like novel PoS approaches that keep appearing in the
literature, or the ones leveraging a network of trust. Finally, it is worth investigating how to
implement the flexible trust architectures we mentioned before, and the possible trade-offs that
may appear.
With respect to deployments for private networks, we believe that the two key points that
should be addressed are: first, more scalability testing, in order to determine an upper bound
on the maximum number of participants without degrading performance. Second, refining or
standardizing the interface between the router and the blockchain. In addition, it is valuable
understanding how to use a private chain as a secure and distributed mapping system for roaming
endpoints with limited computational power, especially regarding read / write performance during
a handover event.
8.2.2 Architectures for Enterprise Networks
Possible improvements for the WireGuard control plane are the ones detailed in section 5.6, like
multi-homing, and improving mobility management to support double jumps. In addition, it would
be interesting to automate the IP address assignment of overlay IP addresses.
Regarding current enterprise networks, we believe it is worth studying the traffic pattern of
such networks, since there are few publications on the topic in the last 5-10 years, and it can help
in future designs. Other relevant topics are quantifying the number of packets that use the default
route and the associated cost, translating FIB reduction to cost, or a deeper study on the trade-offs
when distributing group policies to data plane routers.
Finally, the design for future enterprise networks offers a wide range of open challenges, such as
building a prototype to detail router workflow, how to ensure QoS, or the design of the southbound
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protocol between the mapping system, and the routers and endpoints.
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Johnson Leong, Victor Moreno, Albert Cabellos, Fabio Maino, and Sanjay Hooda. 2020.
SD-Access: Practical Experiences in Designing and Deploying Software Defined Enterprise
Networks. Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperi-
ments and Technologies (CoNEXT), 2020. Association for Computing Machinery, New York,
NY, USA, 496–508. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3386367.3431288
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